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Schall v. Martin: Preventive Detention and
Dangerousness Through the Looking Glass
CHARLES PATRICK EWING*

IN

Lewis Carroll's classic, Through the Looking Glass, the Queen
told Alice:

"[Tihere's the King's Messenger. He's in prison now, being punished; and
the trial doesn't even begin till next Wednesday: and of course the crime
comes last of all."
"Suppose he never commits the crime?" asked Alice.
"That would be all the better, wouldn't it?" the Queen said ...
Alice felt there was no denying that. "Of course it would be all the better," she said: "but it wouldn't be all the better his being punished."
"You're wrong there, at any rate," said the Queen. "Were you ever
punished?"
"Only for faults," said Alice.
"And you were all the better for it, I knowl" the Queen said
triumphantly.
"Yes, but then I had done the things I was punished for," said Alice:
"that makes all the difference."
"But if you hadn't done them," the Queen said, "that would have been
better still; better, and better, and betterl"'
INTRODUCTION

In the words of the old song: "Fairy tales can come true. It
could happen to you, if you're young at heart."2 Tyrone Parson
was indeed young at heart when Lewis Carroll's fairy tale came
true for him. On November 6, 1976, Parson, then fifteen years
old, was arrested and charged with promoting gambling and pos*Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law &Jurisprudence, Adjunct Assistant Professor, Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Buffalo. Ph.D., Cornell University, 1975; J.D. Harvard University, 1983. The author thanks his colleagues, Professor
Philip Halpern of the Faculty of Law &Jurisprudence and Professor Murray Levine of the
Department of Psychology for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. The
author also thanks Jay Goldstein, who served as his research assistant during preparation of
this Article.
1.

L.

CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE

(1983).
2. C. Leigh &J. Richards, Young at Heart (Sunbeam Music Corp. 1954).
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session of a gambling device.3 Parson allegedly had been trying to
entice others into a game of chance known as "three-card
monte. ' ' 4 Following his arrest, Parson was released pending an initial appearance in family court, 5 the court which, in New York
State, has jurisdiction over juveniles charged with all but the most
serious crimes.6
On December 1, 1976, Parson made his initial appearance in
family court on the gambling charges. 7 That initial appearance
(which certainly would have satisfied the Queen) consisted of the
following colloquy:
COURT OFFICER: Will you identify yourself.
TYRONE PARSON: Tyrone Parson, Age 15.
THE COURT: Miss Brown, how many times hasTyrone been known to the
Court?
MISS BROWN: Seven times.
THE COURT: Remand the respondent.8

Parson was remanded to juvenile detention to await a probable cause hearing. After Parson was detained for five days, a probable cause hearing was held on December 6, 1976. At that hearing, the charges against him were dismissed because the offense
alleged did not constitute a crime under the New York Penal
Law.9
For Tyrone Parson, Carroll's fairy tale came true as the result
of a New York statute, now section 320.5(3)(b) of the Family
Court Act.10 Section 320.5(3)(b), like its predecessor, provides that
the family court may order the detention of an alleged juvenile
3. United States ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
affd, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub noam. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
4. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2426 n.21 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
5. Martin, 513 F. Supp. at 698.
6. The New York Family Court Act governs persons between 7 and 16 years of age
alleged to have committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute crimes.
N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 301.2(1) (McKinney 1983). Children 13 or older accused of murder
and those 14 and 15 accused of serious offenses including kidnapping, arson and rape are
treated as "juvenile offenders" and may be prosecuted in criminal court as adults. N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 10.00(18), 30.00(2) (McKinney Supp. 1984).

7. Martin, 513 F. Supp. at 698.
8. Martin, 104 S. Ct. at 2432.
9. Martin, 513 F. Supp. at 699.
10. N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 320.5(3)(b) (McKinney 1983).
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delinquent, even prior to a finding of probable cause, if the court
determines that "there is a serious risk that he may, before the
return date commit an act which if committed by an adult would
constitute a crime.""1
In 1984, after more than six years of litigation regarding its
constitutionality, 2 section 320.5(3)(b) was upheld by the United
States Supreme Court. Writing for himself and five other justices
in Schall v. Martin, Justice Rehnquist concluded that "preventive
detention under the Family Court Act serves a legitimate state objective" and that "the procedural protections afforded pretrial detainees by the New York statute satisfy the requirements of [due
process]." 1 3
In reaching this judgment, the majority further concluded
that "pretrial detention of juveniles properly promotes the interests both of society and the juvenile, ' 14 "serves a legitimate regulatory purpose, ' 1 5 and thus does not constitute "punishment."''
Additionally, and perhaps most significantly, the majority specifically rejected the claim that detention under section 320.5(3)(b)
violates due process because "it is virtually impossible to predict
1
future criminal conduct with any degree of accuracy.'
In responding to this claim, Justice Rehnquist observed:
Our cases indicate ... that from a legal point of view there is nothing

inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct. Such
a judgment forms an important element in many decisions and we have spe-

cifically rejected the contention

. .

. "that it is impossible to predict future

behavior and that the question is so vague as to be meaningless.""'

In a narrow sense, this Article is about Schall v. Martin. The
Supreme Court's reasoning on the due process issue will be examined in light of the available empirical data regarding predic11. Id. The New York Family Court Act was amended, effective July 1, 1983. 1982
N.Y. LAws 926. The predecessor statute, N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 739(a) (McKinney 1976),
provided for the preventive detention of both alleged juvenile delinquents and persons
alleged to be in need of supervision. Under the Act, as amended, § 320.5(3)(b) governs
only alleged delinquents. Tyrone Parson was detained under § 739(a)(ii). See Martin, 513 F.
Supp. at 693, 698.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 19-58.
13. Martin, 104 S. Ct. at 2406.
14. Id. at 2412.
15.

Id.

16. Id. at 2414.
17. Id. at 2417.
18. Id. at 2417 (footnote omitted) (quotingJurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976)).
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tions of future criminal conduct and "dangerousness." In a
broader sense, however, this Article is about the use of predictions of dangerousness in the criminal and juvenile justice systems
and the implications of Martin for the use of such predictions in
future efforts to prevent crime. The Court's treatment of predictions of dangerousness in Martin, it will be argued, represents a
new and significant chapter in the jurisprudence of such predictions, a chapter which portends not only Supreme Court approval
of preventive detention for adult criminal defendants, but also a
move toward expanding the population of juveniles against whom
coercive efforts at crime prevention may be directed.
I.

JUDICIAL ANALYSES OF THE PREDICTIONS REQUIRED BYTHE NEW
YORK STATUTE

In order to comprehend the implications of Martin, it is helpful first to understand how the issue of predicting future criminal
behavior was treated by the various courts which considered the
constitutionality of the New York statute.
Prior to its challenge in the federal courts, New York's juvenile preventive detention statute was scrutinized and upheld by
the state's highest court in 1976.19 In People ex rel. Wayburn v.
Schupf, a state trial court held that the statute violates equal protection. This finding was based on the fact that the statute authorizes pretrial detention of juveniles, yet no comparable authority
exists for the pretrial detention of adults charged with crimes.20
Having so ruled, the court found it "not necessary to consider the
relator's due process contention.

' 21

While the nature of this due

process claim was not specified by the court, on appeal it became
clear that this claim was based upon the purported inability of legal decision-makers to predict future criminal conduct.22
In 1976, the New York Court of Appeals rejected both the
trial court's equal protection rationale and the relator's due pro19. People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 682, 350 N.E.2d 906, 385 N.Y.S.2d
518 (1976).
20. People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 80 Misc. 2d 730, 733, 365 N.Y.S.2d 110, 11314 (Sup. Ct. 1974), modified, 47 A.D.2d 79, 365 N.Y.S.2d 235 (2d Dep't 1975), rev'd, 39
N.Y.2d 682, 350 N.E.2d 906, 385 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1976).
21. Id. at 735, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 115.
22. People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d at 689-90, 350 N.E.2d at 910, 385
N.Y.S.2d at 521-22.
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cess claim.2 3 In denying the due process contention, the court directly confronted "the assertion . . . that because the degree of
probability of repetition of criminal behavior cannot be predicated with scientific precision, there is ineluctably involved an unconstitutional element of vagueness or speculation." 2 4 This "element," said the court, is "necessarily present" in bail, sentencing
and parole decisions and "any other procedure in which discredispositions is vested in a
tionary authority for differing criminal
25
court or an administrative body."1
Judge Fuchsberg, writing separately, agreed that the statute
does not violate equal protection, 6 but found the statute violative
of due process because it offers no criteria for determining which
juveniles pose a "serious risk" of future crime.2 7 This lack of criteria, he suggested, "is no accident" since "as commentators have
pointed out and reputable studies have shown, we presently possess no legal or sociological crystal ball with which to make accurate predictions of future crimes." 2 8 As a result, Judge Fuchsberg
concluded, "choices among juveniles as to who is at risk and who
is not are thus essentially random and inexplicable." 29
Nearly two years later, the New York statute was challenged
for the first time in the federal courts.3 0 In 1981, in United States
ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg,s1 the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York held that while the statute
does not violate equal protection,3 2 it is, "both on its face and as
applied," violative of due process.33 The court's latter conclusion
was based upon two considerations.First, the court found that because it lacked guidelines, the statute's application relied upon
23. Id.
24. Id. at 689-90, 350 N.E.2d at 910, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 522.
25. Id. at 690, 350 N.E.2d at 910, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 522.
26. Id. at 690, 350 N.E.2d at 911, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 522-23 (Fucbsberg, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 691, 350 N.E.2d at 911, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 692, 350 N.E.2d at 911, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
30. The case was certified as a class action in an unpublished opinion on April 3,
1978. See United States ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 693-94 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), affd, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub noam. Schall v. Martin, 104 S.Ct. 2403
(1984).
31. 513 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub
noma.
Schall v. Martin, 104 S.Ct. 2403 (1984).
32. Id. at 706.
33. Id. at 717.

178
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"each judge's subjective views and biases."3 As the court concluded: "The whole process is riddled with subjectivity and caprice and confers upon the judge 'a license for arbitrary
procedure.' "35
Second, after reviewing the results of a number of empirical
studies of the prediction of dangerousness, the court concluded:
[Niot only does it appear that one cannot predict dangerousness with an acceptable degree of accuracy, but, to the extent that dangerousness can be
predicted at all, there is a substantial problem of overprediction, that is, to

identify persons potentially dangerous who, if subsequently released, would
engage in no further violent or even criminal behavior.'

In view of these considerations, the court found it "clear"
that juveniles detained under the New York statute "have their
freedom curtailed by judgments that are untrustworthy and uninformed and without the requisite rationality which due process
37
mandates."
In 1982, a three judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on the ground
that pretrial detention under the New York statute was utilized
primarily "to impose punishment before adjudication of the alleged criminal acts," thus violating due process.38 In reaching this
judgment, the court attached significant weight to statistics proffered by the juvenile appellees showing that "the vast majority of
juveniles detained under [the New York statute] either have their
petitions dismissed before an adjudication . . . or are released after adjudication." 39 In view of these statistics, the court concluded
that "[i]n practice ... the vast majority of the pre-trial detentions
involve either mistakes in judgment fostered by [the statute's] procedurally and substantively unlimited terms or the imposition of
incarceration solely as punishment for unadjudicated crimes. ' 40
In a concurring opinion, Judge Newman was "less certain
than the majority that the record supports a conclusion of a significant number of instances where detention was imposed either
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
Martin,
39.
40.

Id. at 707.
Id. (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966)).
Id. at 709.
Id. at 712.
Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 366 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Schall v.
104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
Id. at 369.
Id. at 373.
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mistakenly or for purposes of punishment."41 Judge Newman concluded that "the statute denies due process ...

not because it has

been shown to yield an unacceptable number of mistaken or impermissible results, but simply because
it needlessly creates an un42
acceptable risk of such results.

Pointing to the "present state of knowledge concerning predictions of criminal behavior," Judge Newman asserted that "only
the foolhardy would deny that even with carefully circumscribed
decision-making, a significant risk of erroneous prediction remains." 43 The New York statute's constitutional flaw, he concluded, was that it "does not include readily available limitations
that would reduce the risk of error.

' 44

Specifically, Judge New-

man referred to the failure of the statute to: (1) limit the crimes
for which arrest would subject a juvenile to detention; (2) require
a finding of probable cause or even any assessment of the
probability that the juvenile to be detained committed the offense
charged; (3) require an assessment of the juvenile's background;
(4) place limits on the type of crime the judge must predict that
the juvenile will commit if released; and (5) specify a standard of
proof by which the evidence must convince the judge of a "seri45
ous risk" of future criminal behavior.
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and held that the New York juvenile
preventive detention statute does not violate due process. 46 In addition to concluding that prediction of criminal conduct is legally
possible 47 and that juvenile preventive detention does not constitute "punishment,

' 48

the Court found that the New York statute

serves two legitimate and compelling state interests: "protecting
the community from crime" 49 and "protecting a juvenile from the
consequences of his criminal activity." 50 These state interests, the
Court further concluded, outweigh the liberty interests of
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 375 (Newman, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 376.
Id. at 377.
Id.
Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2419 (1984).
Id. at 2417.
Id. at 2414.
Id. at 2410.
Id. at 2411.
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juveniles,51 which "must be qualified by the recognition that
52
juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody.
In dissent, Justice Marshall (joined by Justices Brennan and
Stevens) took exception to the majority's treatment of predictions
of dangerousness.53 First, Justice Marshall noted the district
court's conclusion that "no diagnostic tools have as yet been devised which enable even the most highly trained criminologists to
54
predict reliably which juveniles will engage in violent crime."
Then, citing several reviews of empirical research regarding predictions of future crime and "dangerousness," he concluded that
"[t]he evidence supportive of this finding is overwhelming."55
Yet, even "[i]f the record did not establish the impossibility
. . . of reliably predicting whether a given juvenile would commit

a crime before his trial," Justice Marshall indicated that the Court
should "nevertheless still strike down § 320.5(3)(b) because of the
absence of procedural safeguards" such as those suggested by
Judge Newman. 5 Agreeing with Judge Newman that the absence
of such safeguards allows for "the exercise of unfettered discretion as to an issue of considerable uncertainty-likelihood of future criminal behavior,

' 57

Justice Marshall found that such discre-

tion raises two constitutional issues which render the statute
violative of due process: "First, it creates an excessive risk that
juveniles will be detained 'erroneously'-i.e., under circumstances
in which no public interest would be served by their incarceration.
Second, it fosters arbitrariness and inequality in a decision-making
58
process that impinges upon fundamental rights.1

II.

DANGEROUSNESS AND DUE PROCESS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In Martin, the Supreme Court majority conceded that a juvenile's "interest in freedom from institutional restraint, even for
the brief time involved here, is undoubtedly substantial . . . .59
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

2410-12.
2410.
2425-26 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2425 (quoting Martin, 513 F. Supp. at 708).
2425.
2430.
2430 (quoting Martin, 689 F.2d at 375 (Newman, J., concurring)).
2430-31.
2410.
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Where such an interest is to be subordinated to the interest of the
state-as is the case under the New York statute-traditional due
process analysis requires consideration of three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 60

This Section will address, by review of the empirical data regarding predictions of dangerousness, the two questions raised by
the second of these factors: (1) How great is the risk of erroneous
deprivation of a juvenile's liberty interest under the New York
statute? and (2) To what extent, if any, can this risk be reduced by
the imposition of procedural safeguards?
The New York statute clearly requires a prediction of dangerousness, i.e., a finding that "there is a serious risk that [the juvenile] may before the return date commit an act which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime." ' Predictions of future
criminal behavior generally proceed along one of two lines, either
clinical or statistical. The differences between the clinical and statistical approaches have been summarized succinctly as follows:
Clinical prediction is a judgment or opinion based upon information gathered during a personal interview or examination of the subject and formulated through the relatively unstructured process of clinical evaluation ...
Actuarial prediction, on the other hand, uses statistically generated data to
assign probable results based on relatively objective characteristics of the
62
subject.

Empirical research has examined the accuracy of both kinds of
predictions.
A.

Empirical Research Regarding Clinical Predictions

The accuracy of clinical predictions of future criminal conduct has been the subject of a number of empirical studies in the
past dozen years or so.
60. Id. at 2431 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
335 (1976)).
61. N.Y. JUD. LAw § 320.5(3)(b) (McKinney 1983).
62. Dix, Clinical Evaluation of the "Dangerousness" of Normal Criminal Defendants, 66
VA. L. REV. 523, 529 (1980).
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In 1972, Kozol and his colleagues at the Massachusetts Center
for the Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerous Persons reported
on 592 male offenders examined at the Center over a ten year
period.6 3 Each offender was examined by at least two psychologists, two psychiatrists and a social worker, and was given a battery of psychological tests.6 4 Moreover, in each case, a detailed life
history was elicited from "multiple sources," including the offender, his family, friends, neighbors, teachers, employers, and legal and mental health records."'
Overall, 435 of these 592 offenders were released from the
Center. Of this number 386 were diagnosed as not dangerous
while forty-nine were diagnosed as dangerous and released by the
courts against staff advice.66 Dangerousness was defined6 as the
"potential for inflicting serious bodily harm on another. 7
Over a post-release follow-up period of nearly five years,
Kozol found that only seventeen of the forty-nine offenders predicted to be dangerous (34.7 percent) did, in fact, commit a dangerous act.' Thus the rate of "false positives"-those erroneously labeled dangerous-was over 65 percent.
In 1973, the State of Maryland issued a report describing the
first ten years of operation of its Patuxent Institution,6 9 a mental
health/corrections facility similar to the Center for the Diagnosis
and Treatment of Dangerous Persons in Massachusetts.70 Included in the report were data regarding some 421 offenders,
each of whom was treated at Patuxent for at least three years. In
286 of these cases, release was ordered by the courts despite opposition from psychiatric staff members who felt that these offenders
63. Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18
CRIME & DELINQ. 371 (1972).
64. Id. at 383, 386.
65. Id. at 383.
66. Id. at 389.
67. Id. at 372.
68. Id. at 390.
69. Patuxent Inst., Md. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Correctional Servs., Maryland's Defective Delinquency Statute: A Progress Report 2-3 (January 9, 1973) (available in the Charles
B. Sears Law Library at the State University of New York at Buffalo); see also Steadman, A
New Look at Recidivism Among Patuxent Inmates, 5 BuLL AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 200

(1977); Carney, The Indeterminate Sentence at Patuxent, 20 CRIME & DELINQ. 135, 141-42
(1974).
70. J.

MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR

44-45 (1981).
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were dangerous.7 1
Investigators used FBI records to determine how many of
these "dangerous" offenders committed any new offense in the
three years following release. Among the 100 offenders who were
granted a conditional release, the recidivism rate was 39 percent.
The recidivism rate among those 186 offenders released unconditionally was 46 percent. 72 Thus, the rate of "false positives" was
61 percent for the former group and 54 percent for the latter.
More recently, the Patuxent data have been reanalyzed. In
this reanalysis, Steadman found that among offenders predicted to
be dangerous, but released unconditionally, only 41.3 percent
were arrested for violent crimes during the three year follow-up.7 3
Thus, assuming that the staff predictions were predictions of violent criminal behavior, the "false positive" rate for this group of
offenders was close to 59 percent.
Another opportunity to examine the accuracy of clinical predictions of dangerousness arose in New York State as a result of
the United States Supreme Court's 1966 decision in Baxstrom v.
Herold.7 4 In Baxstrom, the Court held that persons committed to
institutions for the criminally insane were denied due process if
they were retained in such institutions beyond the length of the
sentence that would have been imposed for their offenses. In the
wake of Baxstrom, nearly 1000 of "the most dangerous mental patients in the state" were transferred from hospitals for the criminally insane to ordinary state mental hospitals. 5
Steadman and his colleagues monitored the subsequent activities of these "dangerous" offenders, both in the hospitals to which
they were transferred and the communities into which they were
released.7 6 During the four year period following transfer, only 20
percent of these offenders were assaultive in the hospital or community. During the same period, only 3 percent were considered
71. Patuxent Inst., supra note 69, at 3.
72. Id.
73. Steadman, supra note 69, at 205.
74. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
75. Steadman, The Psychiatrist as a ConservativeAgent of Social Control, SoQ PaoBs., Fall
1972, at 263, 265.
76. Steadman & Keveles, The Community Adjustment and CriminalActivity of the Baxstrom
Patients: 1966-1970, 129 AM. J. PSYCHiATRY 304 (1972); see also Hunt & Wiley, Operation
Baxstrom After One Year, 124 AM. J. PsYCHArgY 974 (1968).
77. Steadman & Keveles, supra note 76, at 304.
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sufficiently dangerous
to be transferred back to hospitals for the
78
criminally insane.

The Steadman group also focused on 121 of the Baxstrom inmates who were released into the community. During an average
post-release follow-up of two and a half years only nine of these
"dangerous" offenders (fewer than 8 percent) were convicted of
any crime. Furthermore, only one of these convictions was for a
crime of violence. 9
In 1971, another federal court ruling led to the release of a
similar group of purportedly dangerous "mentally disabled offenders" in Pennsylvania.80 A four year post-release follow-up of
these 438 offenders, reported by Thornberry and Jacoby, found
that only 14 percent were discovered to have committed acts
harmful to others. 81
In yet another study of clinical predictions of dangerousness,
Steadman and Cocozza reported on 257 indicted felony defendants found incompetent to stand trial.82 Each defendant had
been examined by psychiatrists who made specific clinical predictions of dangerousness. The psychiatrists predicted that 60 percent of these defendants were dangerous.8 3 During a three year
follow-up, including time in the hospital and the community, only
14.46 percent of these "dangerous" defendants were rearrested
84
for violent crimes.

In addition to these studies of clinical predictions regarding
adult offenders, two studies have examined the accuracy of such
predictions made regarding juvenile offenders. One of these studies provides a direct assessment of the accuracy of clinical predictions of dangerousness, while the other offers only an indirect
assessment.
The direct assessment study, comparable to those done with
adult offender predictions, was reported by Wenk and Emrich. 85
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Dixon v. Pennsylvania, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
81. T. THORNBERRY & J. JACOBY, THE CRIMINALLY INSANE. A COMMUNITY
MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS

FOLLOWUP OF

197 (1979).

82. Steadman & Cocozza, Psychiatry, Dangerousness and the Repetitively Violent Offender,
69 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 226, 227 (1978).
83. Id.
84. See id. at 229, Table 2.
85. F. WENK & R. EMRICH, ASSAULTIVE YOUTH: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF THE As-
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This study examined the accuracy of psychiatric consultants' assessments of the potential for violence of 511 wards of the California Youth Authority. Of the 118 youths in this group clinically
evaluated as posing a moderate or high potential for violence,
only nine (7.6 percent) recidivated by committing a violent offense
during a fifteen month post-release follow-up period."6 Thus, the
"false positive" rate for these clinical predictions was more than
92 percent.
The indirect assessment of clinical predictions of juvenile
87
dangerousness was conducted in New York by Schlesinger.
Schlesinger combed the clinical and research literature regarding
violent behavior among juveniles. Based on this review, he isolated thirty different factors posited to be predictive of violent behavior among children and adolescents. Schlesinger also surveyed
the staff of a juvenile court psychiatric clinic. This survey yielded
an additional sixteen factors said by clinicians to be predictive of
violent behavior in juveniles.88
Schlesinger then examined the court and clinic records of
122 juveniles referred for psychiatric evaluations before disposition of their cases. In this review, he had access to "all information about the juvenile available to the clinic staff and the
judges."89 Using court files and probation department records,
Schlesinger was able to follow the activities of these youths for a
one year period. During this period, only seven of the 122
juveniles were found to have committed a violent offense. Moreover, among this sample, there was no statistically significant relationship between the commission of violent offenses and any of
the predictor variables.90
While the percentage of "false positives" varies among these
studies (and, in some instances, within studies as a function of the
behavioral criterion used), it seems fair to conclude that, in general, no more than one out of three clinical predictions of dangerSAULTIVE EXPERIENCE AND ASSAULTIVE POTENTIAL OF CALIFORNIA YouTH AUTHORITY WARDS

(Report distributed by National Technical Information Services, U.S. Department of Commerce, April 1972).
86. Id. at 125-26.
87. Schlesinger, The Predictionof Dangerousness in juveniles: A Replication, 24 CRIME &
DELINQ. 40 (1978).
88. Id. at 41-43.
89.

Id. at 44.

90. Id. at 46.
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ousness proves to be accurate. 91 In other words, for every three
individuals predicted to commit crimes of violence, only one is
likely to fulfill that prophesy. From the Wenk and Emrich results,
it appears that clinical predictions regarding the dangerousness of
juveniles are likely to be even less accurate. 92
None of these studies of clinical prediction is free of methodological flaws. 3 Indeed, one major criticism common to all of
them is that they may have underestimated the extent to which
those predicted to be dangerous actually engage in subsequent
criminally dangerous behavior. 94 Obviously, not all such behavior
can be detected in any population.
Yet after years of carefully examining these studies in light of
other criminological research, Monahan has concluded that these
studies "provide reasonably accurate estimates of the validity of

clinical predictions of violence. 9 1 5 Monahan's conclusion in this
regard is based in large measure upon other criminological data
which "support the argument that the one-third of the individuals
who are predicted as violent and are arrested for a violent crime
are in fact the same people who commit most of the unreported
and unsolved violent acts." 96 As Monahan puts it: "It is not that
the false positives are really true positives in disguise but rather
that the true positives are 'truer' (i.e., more violent) than we
'97
imagined.
B.

Empirical Research Regarding StatisticalPredictions

Since at least 1923, researchers have sought to develop accurate statistical techniques for the prediction of criminal behavior.9a One line of this research has dealt with the prediction of
91. This is the conclusion reached in J. MONAHAN, supra note 70, at 47. Other commentators have suggested that clinical predictions of dangerousness are inaccurate 95 percent of the time. See, e.g., B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 20
(1978). In view of the empirical research, such an estimate seems clearly exaggerated.
92. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
93. The methodological criticisms of several of these studies have been reviewed in J.
MONAHAN, supra note 70, at 50-56.
94. Monahan, The Predictionof Violent Behavior: Developments in Psychology and Law, in
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 147 (C. Scheirer & B. Hammonds eds. 1983).
95. Id. at 159 (emphasis in original).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Hart, PredictingParole Success, 14 J. AM. INST. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 405
(1923).
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criminal behavior in samples of non-offenders (i.e., individuals
who have yet to be identified as criminals or delinquents). Another line of studies has examined the prediction of recidivism
among already convicted criminals. Finally, a third line of research has focused upon prediction of violent criminal behavior.
1. Prediction of Criminal Behavior Among Non-Offenders. Perhaps the best known studies of the first type are those that were
conducted by, or based upon the work of, the late Sheldon and
Eleanor Glueck of Harvard Law School. 99 Holding constant factors such as age, intelligence, and neighborhood of residence, the
Gluecks found statistically significant relationships between juvenile delinquency and a number of other variables: paternal discipline, maternal supervision, parental affection and family cohesiveness. 100 The Gluecks then used these variables to develop an
actuarial table for predicting the probability that a given child
would become a juvenile delinquent. 01'
Two sorts of efforts were made to validate (i.e., test the accuracy of) the Gluecks' predictive table. The first type of validation
studies were retrospective, applying the Glueck table to youngsters already identified as delinquent. 0 2 According to Sheldon
Glueck, "The typical outcome of these checkups is that in some
nine-tenths of the cases (very occasionally a somewhat lower proportion) the Glueck table would have correctly identified the boys
at a very early age as potential persistent delinquents ....
The second type of validation studies of the Glueck table
were prospective-i.e., they involved attempts to predict which
youngsters would become delinquent. Since that was the stated
purpose for the Glueck table,'"' these studies come closest to true
validations of the table. Sheldon Glueck described two such
studies.
99. The Gluecks studied juvenile delinquents and young adult criminals for some 40
years. A chronological bibliography of their 258 publications is provided in E. GLUECK & S.
GLUECK, VENTURES IN CRIMINOLOGY 347-64 (1964). Among their publications dealing with
prediction are: S.GLUECK & E. GLUECK, PREDICTING DELINQUENCY AND CRIME (1960) [hereinafter cited as PREDICTING DELINQUENCY]; S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, UNRAVELING JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY (1950); and S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, OF DELINQUENCY AND CRIME (1974)
[hereinafter cited as DELIQUENCY & CRIME].
100. PREDICTING DELINQUENCY, supra note 99, at 23-31.
101. Id. at 118-26.
102. Id. at 127-32.
103. DELINQUENCY & CRIME, supra note 99, at 311.
104. PREDICTING DELINQUENCY, supra note 99, at 123.
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The first was a seven year longitudinal study of New York
City boys entering the first grade. Of 235 boys involved, 186 were
predicted at school entrance to be "non-delinquents" while thirtyseven were predicted to become "delinquents." At the end of
seven years, 176 (or 94.6 percent) of those predicted to be "nondelinquents" were "still . . . in fact non-delinquent-a remarkable confirmation . . .. "105 On the other hand, at the end of this

same period, "[o]f thirty-seven boys predicted as delinquents, thirteen are already adjudicated delinquents and four more are 'unofficial' offenders, making a total of 46 percent-again a remarkable confirmation of a forecast." '
The other prospective validation study reported by Glueck involved 179 District of Columbia school children with various classroom problems. According to the Glueck table, 158 of these children were likely to become delinquent. During a four year followup period, it was found that "58 of these children had already
been to court or police for delinquent acts."107
While Glueck never directly acknowledged that these studies
found "false positive" rates of 54 percent and 63.3 percent , respectively, he did observe:
The "false positives" aspect of the problem is not a scientific one but an
issue in social ethics and social policy. In this connection, it is very important
to point out that mistakes in not spotting future delinquentscan be very costly
to society, while mistakes in assuming a few persons to be potential delinquents ...

who nevertheless ultimately turn out not to be delinquents can

do little harm and might even do considerable good. 10 8

In a more recent British study, West and Farrington followed
a group of 411 eight and nine year old boys until each had
reached age twenty-five. 09 Before the boys turned ten years old,
the researchers rated them on "as many factors as possible" including the extent to which they were "troublesome" in school.110
Looking at the boys' juvenile delinquency records at age sev105. DEUNQUENCY & CRIME, supra note 99, at 312.
106. Id. at 312-13.
107. Id. at 313. These 58 children were 36.7 percent of the group predicted likely to
become deliquent.
108. Id. at 316 (emphasis in original).
109. Early Identification and Classification ofJuvenile Delinquents: HearingBefore the Sub.
committee on Juvenile Justice of the Senate Committee on the Constitution, 97th Cong., 1st Sess,
35-37 (1981) (prepared statement of Dr. David P. Farrington).

110. Id.at41.
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enteen the researchers found that "troublesomeness" in school as
rated by teachers and peers before age ten proved to be the best
single predictor of delinquency. Based on this variable alone, the
researchers found that they could have made accurate predictions
of delinquency in 44.6 percent of the cases. When "troublesomeness" was combined with five other factors (family socio-economic
status, family size, parental criminal convictions, parental behavior
toward the boy, and intelligence"l"), the researchers found that
they could have made accurate predictions of delinquency in
about 50 percent of the cases.' As they concluded, "the limit of
predictability with these data was reached in identifying a vulnerable group of whom half became delinquents." 3
The West and Farrington study also examined the ability of a
number of variables to predict future violent behavior in their cohort. They found that teachers' ratings of aggressiveness made
before the boys turned ten years old were the best predictors of
violent behavior. Of the quarter of the cohort rated most aggressive, "14 percent became violent delinquents."'1 4 As the researchers readily admitted, "[t]his prediction had a very high false positive rate of 86 percent.""15 When West and Farrington relied
upon self-reports of violence rather than convictions for violent
offenses, the "false positive" rate fell to 60 percent (i.e., 40 percent of those in the top quarter in terms of aggressiveness ratings
reported "involvement in fights, starting fights, carrying weapons,
and using weapons in fights")." 6
In 1983, Loeber and Dishion reported the results of an extensive review of the empirical literature regarding predictions of
delinquency based upon objective predictors." 7 They included in
their review every study they could locate which contained data
making it possible to specify both the type and percentage of predictive errors." 8 The studies they reviewed are pertinent here because their data provide a means of specifying the percentage of
111. Id.
112. Id. at 41-42.
113. Id. at 42.
114. Id. at 46.
115. Id. at 46-47.
116. Id. at 47.
117. Loeber & Dishion, Early Predictorsof Male Delinquency: A Review, 94 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL 68 (1983).
118. Id. at 73.
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"false positives" (i.e., those predicted to become delinquents who
did not) yielded by a variety of predictors. The results of these
studies are aggregated in Table One below.
TABLE ONE
Predictor(s)
Utilized

No. of No. Predicted
Studies to become
Delinquent

Behavior 2
Educational
Factors'
Family Size

21

No. Who
did not
become
Delinquent

Percent
False
Positives-1

24

4355

2824

64.8

6

2938

1754

59.7

2

1444

1169

80.9

Separation from
Parents/Parental
Conflict12

5

762

575

75.5

Delinquency Among
Family Members 24

6

1153

793

68.8

Parenting

12 5

2

259

180

69.5

Prior Delinquency
Record "

5

586

306

52.1

Parents SocioRecord' 2'

5

6197

3966

59.7

7

1214

804

66.2

Composite of
Predictors 2 s
TOTAL

18,908

12,104

64.0

As this Table illustrates, regardless of which predictors are
utilized, attempts to predict delinquency among non-offenders
have resulted in overall "false positive" rates well over 50 percent.
2. Prediction of Recidivism Among Convicted Offenders. Most of
the studies examining statistical predictions of recidivism among
119. The percentage of "false positives" in this table for each predictive category (i.e.,
behavior, educational factors, family size, etc.) is derived from the following formula:
(Number predicted to become delinquent who did not become
Percent False Positive = delinquent) x (100)
(Number predicted to become delinquent)
This is the standard formula used by researchers and reviewers to calculate the percentage of "false positives," i.e., the percentage of those individuals predicted to commit crimes
who do not, in fact, commit crimes. See C. BARTOL, PSYCHOLOGY AND AMERICAN LAW 104
(1983). This is also the formula relied upon at other points in this Article.
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already convicted offenders have been attempts to validate actua-.
rial devices developed to predict parole success or failure.1 2 Overall, these studies have demonstrated that "a few familiar
items-such as the offender's criminal history, age, employment
and drug history-could be combined to identify subgroups of offenders having a higher probability of returning to crime than
convicted offenders generally."-13 0 Yet they have also "produced
an embarassingly large number of false positives." 131 Indeed, as
one recent review has concluded, "For the past 50 years, high
false positive rates have consistently bedevilled every effort to predict recidivism. False positive rates of 50 to 60 percent have been
1 32
the rule.
The "false positive" problem in predictions of recidivism is
well illustrated by validation studies of the "salient factor score,"
the instrument used by the United States Parole Commission to
predict parole success.1 33 This device relies upon an additive comFor each predictive category in the table, this formula was applied to the raw data (i.e.,
the number of positive predictions and the number of "false positives") provided by Loeber
and Dishion in their review. It should be noted, however, that in their own analyses,
Loeber and Dishion employed a different and potentially misleading formula:
(Number predicted to become delinquent who did not become
delinquent) x (100)
Percent False Positive =

(Number predicted to become delinquent) + (number
predicted not to become delinquent)

Loeber & Dishion, supra note 117, at 70. This latter measure will produce a lower false
positive rate in all cases where the number predicted not to become delinquent is greater
than zero.
120. Loeber & Dishion, supra note 117, at 74-76.
121. Id. at 83.
122. Id. at 85.
123. Id. at 87.
124. Id. at 88.
125. Id. at 90.
126. Id. at 80.
127. Id.at 84.
128. Id. at 92.
129. See von Hirsch & Gottfredson, Selective Incapacitation:Some Queries About Research
Design and Equity, 12 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.

CHANGE

11, 13-14 (1983-1984).

130. Id. at 14.
131. Id. at 15.
132. Blackmore & Welsh, Selective Incapacitation:Sentencing According to Risk, 29 CRIME
& DE TINQ. 504, 516 (1983).
133. Hoffman & Beck, Revalidating the Salient Factor Score: A Research Note, 8 J. CRIM.
JusT. 185, 186 (1980).
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bination of weighted scores on seven factors: number of prior
convictions, number of prior incarcerations, age at first commitment, current commitment offense, history of parole violation,
history of drug dependence, and record of employment. Total
scores range from 11 to 0 and are used to classify parole applications into four risk groups: very good risk (11-9), good risk (8-6),
fair risk (5-4) and poor risk (3-0).134

Researchers with the Parole Commission have reported three
separate validation studies of the "salient factor score," conducted
in 1970, 1971 and 1976.135 The 1976 study utilized a post-release
follow-up of one year and defined a "favorable outcome" as "no
new arrest and no parole violation warrant issued. 1

38

A "similar

follow-up period/outcome criterion" was utilized in both the
1970 and 1971 studies. 13 7 The results of these studies are summa-

rized in Table Two below.
TABLE TWO13 8
Percent of Parolees With FavorableOutcomes
Very
Poor Risk Fair Risk Good Risk Good Risk
(0-3)
(4-5)
(6-8)
(9-11)
1970
1971
1976

51%
51%
56%

64%
60%
63%

76%
78%
73%

91%
91%
92%

As can be seen from this Table, the percentage of "favorable
outcomes" among parolees predicted to be "poor risks" ranged
from 51 percent in 1970 and 1971 to 56 percent in 1976. In
other words, application of the "salient factor score" predictive
device results in "false positive" rates consistently higher than 50
percent.
In their review of the delinquency literature described above,
Loeber and Dishion also reviewed a number of studies which assessed the accuracy of predictions of recidivism among juvenile
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

187.
186-87.
186.
186-87.

138. Adapted from Hoffman & Beck, supra note 133, at 186.
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delinquents.139 The results of the studies they reviewed are aggregated in Table Three below.
TABLE THREE
Predictor(s)
Utilized

No. of No. Predicted No. Who
Percent
Studies to Recidivate Did not
False
Recidivate Positives 4 o

Behavior""'
Parent Socio14
Economic Status 2
1 41
Family Size
Delinquency Among
144
Family Members
Composite 45
of
1
Predictors
TOTAL

3

713

274

38.4

2085

808

38.7

47

32

68.1

130

43

33.1

1263

870
2027

68.9

4238

47.8

As can be seen from this Table, predictions of recidivism
among juvenile delinquents have proven somewhat more accurate
than those of adult offenders. Yet, overall, the "false positive"
rate yielded by these predictions has been close to 50 percent.
3. Predictionof Violent Criminal Behavior. In addition to studies emphasizing recidivism in general, there is also a body of empirical research evaluating statistical predictions of violent behavior. Three such studies, carried out by California corrections
authorities in the 1960s, were reported by Wenk and his colleagues in 1972.148 In the first of these studies, parole officials de-

veloped a "violence prediction scale." 147 This statistically derived
scale included as predictor variables: the number of previous offenses, length of incarceration, drug abuse, and current commitment offense. Using these factors, the officials isolated a group of
parolees three times more likely than other offenders to commit
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
(1972).
147.

See Loeber & Dishion, supra note 117.
See supra note 119.
See Loeber & Dishion, supra note 117, at 77.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 88-89.
See id. at 93.
See Wenk, Robinson & Smith, Can Violence Be Predicted?, 18
Id. at 395.
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acts of violence. Still, 86 percent of the offenders in this high risk
group were not found to have committed an act of violence while
148
on parole.
In the second California study, researchers were given access
to offender histories and psychiatric reports on 7,712 parolees.
Based on these data, they assigned each of the parolees to one of
six distinct categories of risk for violent behavior. 21 percent were
assigned to the high risk, "potentially aggressive" category. 49 In a
one year follow-up of parolees in this group, the researchers
found that only five of the 1,630 parolees so classified were convicted of crimes of violence.1 50
The final study reported by Wenk dealt with 4,146 wards of
the California Youth Authority, who were monitored for fifteen
months following their release from juvenile institutions. On the
basis of data gathered regarding this sample, the researchers concluded that predictions of violent recidivism based solely upon a
youth's history of actual violence would result in a "false positive"
rate of 95 percent.1 51 Moreover, even after analyzing data on 100
variables and utilizing sophisticated multivariate statistical techniques, the researchers were never able to attain better than an 88
percent rate of "false positives."1
More recently, a Michigan study has also examined the accuracy of statistical predictions of violent recidivism.1 53 The Michigan Corrections Department collected data on 350 variables for
2,200 male parolees. Statistical analyses of data derived from half
of this sample were used to create an actuarial table for predicting
violent crime during parole. This table utilized the following predictor variables: nature of the parolee's commitment offense, juvenile felony record, age at first arrest, record of institutional misconduct, and marriage. 1 "5
148. Id.
149. Id. at 395-96.
150. Id. at 396.
151. Id. at 399-400.
152. Id. at 397-401. For a more detailed analysis of the variables considered in the
study, see Wenk & Emrich, Assaultive Youth: An Exploratory Study of the Assaultive Experience
and Assaultive Potential of California Youth Authority Wards, 9 J. RESEARCH CRIME & DELINQ.
171 (1972).
153. Program Bureau, Mich. Dep't. of Corrections, The Parole Risk Study Uune 29,
1978) (available in the Charles Sears Law Library at the State University of New York at
Buffalo).
154. Id. at 11.
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Using this table, corrections officials classified the other half
of the parolee sample according to risk of assaultive behavior:
very high, high, middle, low or very low risk. Among parolees
designated as being at "very high risk" (4.7 percent of the sam-

ple), the rate of violent recidivism during a fourteen month follow-up was only 40 percent. Moreover, the violent recidivism
rates for the "high risk" and "middle risk" parolees were only
155
20.7 percent and 11.8 percent respectively.
Another major study of statistical prediction was reported in
1971 by a group of researchers at Harvard Law School.1 56 The
Harvard study examined the predictive mechanism of the District
of Columbia's "preventive detention" law, 57 which provides that
"any defendant charged with a dangerous crime, with obstructing
justice, or with a violent crime if certain conditions are met may
be held for a pre-trial detention hearing, at which a judicial officer
is to determine whether any form of release can satisfactorily pro15
' 8
tect the community.
If the judicial officer does not so conclude, the defendant may
be detained for up to sixty days. 59
In making this determination, judicial officers are directed by
the law to
take into account such matters as the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against such person, his family
ties, employment, financial resources, character and mental conditions, past
conduct, length of residence in the community, record of convictions, and
any record 9 f appearances at court proceedings, flight to avoid prosecution,
or failure to appear at court proceedings.""0

The law does not specify any relative importance to be attributed
to these criteria.
The Harvard researchers used these criteria (except for
weight of the evidence) to develop two predictive scales, which
were then applied in a six month follow-up of a sample of 657
adult criminal defendants in Massachusetts, all of whom were
155. Id.
156. See Note, Preventive Detention: An Empirical Analysis, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REv. 300
(1971).
157. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(a)(1), (b)-(e) (1981).
158. Note, supra note 156, at 303-04 (footnotes omitted) (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 231322(a)(1), (b)-(e) (1981)).
159. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(d)(2)(A) (1981).

160. Id. § 23-1321(b).
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charged with crimes defined in the District of Columbia statute as
"dangerous" but were freed pending trial."'
One scale (DS-1) assigned weights to each of the District of
Columbia criteria based on a subjective assessment of their importance. The other scale (DS-2) was derived by statistically readjusting each criterion's weight on the basis of its actual correlation to
recidivism in the Massachusetts sample. 6 2 Application of either
scale involved selecting a cut-off score, above which a defendant
would be detained as dangerous. 63
On neither scale was there a cut-off point at which more recidivists than non-recidivists would be detained. 6 In order to detain all recidivists, cut-off scores would have to have been set so
low as to produce "false positive" rates of 88.5 percent (DS-1) and
84.6 percent (DS-2).16 5 Even the most promising cut-off scores 66
would have yielded "false positive" rates of 74.3 percent (DS-1)
and 58.7 percent (DS-2). 67 All of these studies of statistical prediction are, of course, subject to many of the same methodological
criticisms that have been leveled against the clinical prediction
studies reviewed earlier. 68 Yet, despite such criticisms, it seems
fair to conclude that these studies provide a reasonably accurate
assessment of the state of the art. To summarize that assessment,
it appears that statistical predictions of criminal behavior in general, and violent criminal behavior in particular, are much more
likely to be wrong than right.
C.

Empirical Analysis of the Due Process Questions

These studies of clinical and statistical prediction provide an
empirical basis for responding to the two questions posed at the
outset in this Section: (1) How great is the risk of erroneous deprivation of a juvenile's liberty interests under the New York statute?
161. See Note, supra note 156, at 309-10.
162. Id. at 310 & 315 n.86. See also generally Q. MCNEMAR, PSYCHOLOGICAL STATISTICS
188-213 (4th ed. 1969) (the mathematical technique of "statistical readjustment" is herein
described as "multiple correlation").
163. Id. at 314-16.
164. Id. at 316.
165. See id. at 314, 316. See also supra note 119.
166. A "promising" cut-off score is one with a relatively low false positive (non-recidivist-to-recidivist) rate. Id. at 315.
167. See id. at 314-16. See also supra note 119.
168. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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(2) To what extent, if any, might this risk be reduced by procedural safeguards?
1.

The Magnitude of the Risk. The first of these two questions

may be rephrased as follows: What is the likely "false positive"
rate for predictions made by family court judges under the New
York statute? Any answer to this question requires consideration
of a number of preliminary questions: (1) What is being predicted?
(2) About whom are these predictions being made? (3) On what
basis are these predictions made?
The New York statute requires the judge to determine
whether there is a "serious risk" that the juvenile will commit a
criminal act before the next court appearance."0 9 Thus, all the
judge is required to predict is that the juvenile will commit any
act, however minor, for which the state has established a criminal
penalty. The statute speaks of "serious risk," but that term applies
to the likelihood rather than the nature of the predicted offense.
The New York Family Court Act governs individuals between
the ages of seven and sixteen years alleged to have committed acts
which, if committed by adults, would constitute crimes.170 The
New York Penal Law, however, exempts from family court jurisdiction children thirteen or older accused of murder, and children
fourteen or older accused of kidnapping, arson, rape and several
other of the most serious crimes. These youngsters are designated
"juvenile offenders" and may be tried in adult criminal courts.171
Ironically, juveniles in this group of alleged serious offenders are
not subject to preventive detention under the New York statute or
any other provision of New York law.'7 As a result, predictions
made by judges under the New York juvenile preventive detention statute generally are limited to juveniles charged with less serious offenses.
The basis for the judge's prediction is not specified by the
New York statute. As the dissenting justices pointed out in Martin,
"[t]he information on which the judge makes his determination is
169. See N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 320.5(3)(b) (McKinney 1983).
170. See N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 301.2(1) (McKinney 1983).
171. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(18), 30.00(2) (McKinney Supp. 1984).
172. The New York Criminal Procedure laws makes no provision for refusal to order
bail or release on recognizance based on predictions of future criminal conduct. See N.Y.
CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 510.30(2) (McKinney 1984).
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very limited."'1 The decision is made during a brief hearing resembling an arraignment in an adult case. 1 74 If a juvenile has been
taken into custody upon arrest, this hearing must be held the next
175
court day or within seventy-two hours, whichever comes first.
Thus, it is no surprise that only a limited amount of data regarding the juvenile can be gathered. Before the judge are the petition
alleging delinquency, one or more affidavits specifying the juvenile's involvement in the offense alleged, and a written report prepared by a probation officer based upon a brief interview with the
juvenile, the arresting officer and, in some cases, the juvenile's
parent or guardian. 7 Rarely do either7 7the probation officer or
the complainant appear at the hearing.1
Typically, counsel is appointed at the time the case is called,
"only moments before convincing reasons must be presented to
the court for not ordering pretrial detention.' '1 7 Generally the
judge does not interview the juvenile or inquire into the truth of
the allegations. 79 The average hearing lasts from five to fifteen
minutes and the judge's decision regarding detention is rendered
immediately.180
As the district court observed in Martin, the judge's prediction "bears a superficial resemblance" to both clinical and statistical predictions but "lacks the refinements of each."'' In the
words of the court:
The judge's assessment could not properly be called a clinical prediction, unless it could be supposed that the judge's experience on the bench

substitutes for a clinician's training; his confrontation with the accused juvenile substitutes for a diagnostic interview and examination; and thejuvenile's
arrest record substitutes for a patient's history. Nor is the evaluation by the
judge in any way comparable to a rigorous statistical prediction. In comparison to the large number of variables used in the studies of statistical prediction, apparently very little data is available to the judge. 182
173. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2420 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
174. Id.
175. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 307.3(4) (McKinney 1983).
176. Martin, 104 S. Ct. at 2420-21.
177. Id. at 2421.
178. United States ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
affd, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
179. Martin, 104 S. Ct. at 2421.
180. Id.
181. Martin, 513 F. Supp. at 712.
182. Id.
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In sum, the New York statute provides for preventive detention of juveniles charged with less serious crimes based upon

largely intuitive predictions of any sort of criminal behavior. With
that conclusion in mind, the empirical research reviewed earlier

may be used to assess the likely risk of error (i.e., the "false positive" rate) in detentions ordered under the statute.
The studies of clinical prediction reviewed earlier establish

"false positive" rates ranging from 54 to 92 percent, with an average rate of 76 percent.1 83 Studies of statistical prediction have established remarkably similar "false positive" rates. Statistical predictions of criminal behavior have been found to result in "false
positive" rates ranging from about 50 percent to over 99
18
percent. 4
Many of the predictions reviewed in both sets of studies, however, were predictions of violent criminal behavior. Such behavior
is statistically rare, certainly much rarer-and thus more difficult
to predict-than crime in general. 5 In this sense, the results of
these studies may not generalize to the predictions made by judges
under the New York statute. Since New York judges are predicting criminal behavior of any sort, their predictions might be
thought to prove more accurate than many of those examined in
the empirical research.
On the other hand, there is a good reason to believe that the
predictions assessed by this research are more rather than less accurate than those made by the judges. First, in contrast to the
largely intuitive and generally poorly informed predictions made
by the judges, most of the predictions studied were either clinical
predictions made by mental health professionals using standard
and generally accepted assessment techniques or statistical predictions based upon sophisticated multivariate analyses. Second, unlike many, if not most, of the predictions made by the judges, the
bulk of the studied predictions were made regarding offenders
with already well-established histories of criminal behavior and/or
violent criminal behavior. This difference is particularly important, since by far the single most potent predictor of future crime
183. See supra notes 63-84 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 98-128 and accompanying text.
185. von Hirsch, Predictionof Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted
Persons, 21 BuFFALO L. Ruv. 717, 733, 735-36 (1972).
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These considerations, coupled with the overall manner in
which such judicial predictions are made, suggest that the "false
positive" rate for predictions of criminal conduct made under the
New York statute is certainly no less than 50 percent and probably a great deal higher. Thus to answer the question originally
posed: The risk of erroneous deprivation of a juvenile's liberty interests
under the statute is considerable, to say the least.
2. The Likely Impact of ProceduralSafeguards. In his concurring opinion in Martin, Judge Newman suggested that the constitutional flaw in the New York statute is that it "does not include
readily available limitations which would reduce the risk of error."18 7 Judge Newman specified five such limitations, the probable efficacy of which may be assessed in light of the empirical re18 8
search reviewed above.
a. Limiting the crimesfor which arrest would subject a juvenile to
detention. As Judge Newman stated, "[e]ven the most ardent advocates of preventive detention do not claim that the commission of
any crime, no matter how minor, provides an adequate basis for
predicting commission of a future crime."' Apparently Judge
Newman would have application of the New York statute limited
to those juveniles charged with serious crimes. 90
The empirical research, however, does not support the notion
that such a limitation would reduce the rate of "false positives."
Many of the studies reviewed dealt with predictions made regarding offenders charged with or convicted of serious crimes. For example, in the Harvard study, which found "false positive" rates of
74 and 88.5 percent, every one of the 657 defendants had been
charged with "violent or dangerous" crimes. 9 ' Wenk's study of
juvenile statistical predictions found a "false positive" rate of 88.8
percent (an eight-to-one ratio of "false positives" to "true positives"). 92 Yet every one of the 4,146 subjects in this study had
186. See J. MONAHAN, supra note 70, at 104.
187. Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 377 (2d Cir. 1982) (Newman, J., concurring).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. The New York preventive detention statute does not apply to juveniles charged
with serious crimes and tried in criminal court as adults. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
191. See Note, supra note 156, at 307.
192. See Wenk, Robinson & Smith, supra note 146, at 400-01.
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been committed to the California Youth Authority.19 As Wenk
points out: "In California, the most serious juvenile offenders are
committed to the Department of the Youth Authority."'19 Furthermore, all of the 511 subjects involved in the study of clinical
predictions reported by Wenk and Emrich were among this class
of most serious offenders. This study found a "false positive" rate
of 92 percent. 95
b. Requiring a finding of probable cause, or at least an assessment of the probability that the juvenile committed the crime charged.
The New York statute authorizes pretrial detention without a
finding of probable cause.196 Requiring a finding of probable
cause might well reduce the number of candidates for detention
under the statute. But would it substantially reduce the likelihood
of erroneous predictions regarding those juveniles-probably the
vast majority-for whom probable cause would likely be found?
The answer provided by the empirical research dealing with predictions regarding convicted adult offenders and adjudicatedjuvenile offenders is clearly "no." Those studies which have examined
predictions of recidivism among convicted or adjudicated offenders have found "false positive" rates in roughly the 50 to 60 percent range.197 These results represent some, but not much, im-

provement over predictions of crime made regarding nonoffenders. 9"
c. Requiring an assessment of the juvenile's background. This
limitation has considerable intuitive appeal. Presumably, the more
a judge knows about the juvenile's background, the more likely it
is that he or she will accurately predict the risk that the juvenile
will engage in future criminal conduct. The empirical research belies this presumption however. The bulk of the studies reviewed
involved predictions of future criminal behavior made on the basis
193. Id. at 397.
194. Id. at 396 (emphasis added).
195. E. Wenk & R. Emrich, supra note 85, at 125-26.
196. However, should a juvenile be detained under N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 320.5(3)(b)
(McKinney 1983), the court will set a date for a probable cause hearing on the charged
offense(s), id. § 320.4(2)(a), (c). Such a hearing must "be held within three days following
the initial appearance or within four days following the filing of a petition, whichever occurs sooner," id. § 325.1(2), except that the court may for cause "adjourn the hearing for
no more than an additional three court days," id. § 325.1(3). Without a finding of probable
cause at that hearing, the juvenile must be released from detention. See id. § 325.3(4).
197. See supra notes 129-45 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 99-128 and accompanying text.
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of extensive data regarding the subjects' backgrounds. Kozol's
study of clinical predictions, 199 for example, is perhaps the clearest
evidence that assessment of a subject's background does not guarantee accuracy of prediction. Subjects in this study were all examined by at least two psychologists, two psychiatrists, and a social
worker.200 Moreover, these extensive clinical examinations were
supplemented by a full battery of psychological tests and "a meticulous reconstruction of the [subject's] life history elicited from
multiple sources."20 1 Yet predictions based upon these "background" assessments yielded a "false positive" rate of 65
percent. 0 2
In the Wenk study of statistical predictions regarding juvenile
wards of the California Youth Authority, "[e]xtensive background
information available on each subject ' 20 3 included elaborate case
histories, current measures of mental and emotional functioning
and prognostic judgments (counselors' ratings of academic and vocational potential plus their recommendations for type of training). Yet the most accurate predictions possible, utilizing this "extensive background information," resulted in a "false positive"
rate of more than 88 percent.204 Other studies of predictions
based upon composites of various background data have found
"false positive" rates in excess of 65 percent. 20 5
d. Limiting predictions to certain types of crimes. The New York
statute allows a juvenile to be detained on the basis of a prediction
that he or she will commit any crime before the return date.200
Would a requirement limiting predictions to violent or serious
crime reduce the rate of "false positives" and thus the risk of erroneous detention? Both simple logic and the empirical research
indicate that it would not.
Serious crimes (especially violent crimes) are statistically rare,
certainly much rarer than less serious or minor crimes.20 7 The
rarer an event, the more difficult it is to accurately predict its oc199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, supra note 63.
Id. at 383.
Id.
Id. at 390-91.
Wenk, Robinson & Smith, supra note 146, at 397.
Id. at 401.
See supra notes 119, 140 and accompanying text.
N.Y. FAM. CT. Aar § 320.5(3)(b) (McKinney 1983).
See von Hirsch, supra note 185, at 733.
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currence.20° Logically, a judge's predictions of serious or violent
crimes are more likely to prove erroneous than those of less serious or minor crimes.
The reality of this logic is demonstrated by the empirical research. Studies of recidivism in general have found "false positive" rates in the 50 to 60 percent range. 0 9 On the other hand,
studies of predictions of serious or violent criminal conduct have
found "false positive" rates ranging from 65 to over 99
210
percent.
e. Setting a standard of proof by which the judge must be convinced that the juvenile poses a "serious risk" offuture criminal behavior. New York's juvenile preventive detention statute does not
specify any standard of proof by which the judge must be convinced that the juvenile to be detained poses a future risk to society. Similar statutes in several other jurisdictions require proof by
"clear and convincing evidence." '
In the American legal system, there are basically three standards of proof: preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.21 2 While
these standards have not been (and perhaps cannot be) quantified, 13 some commentators have suggested that "evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt" roughly corresponds to at least 90 percent
certainty, "clear and convincing evidence" to 75 percent certainty, and "preponderance of the evidence" to better than 50
percent certainty.21 4
From the empirical research, it appears that at best, predictions of dangerousness or future criminal conduct are more often
wrong than right. In speaking of clinical predictions, Steadman
and Cocozza have observed that "any attempt to commit an individual solely on the basis of dangerousness would be futile if
208. Id.
209. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 146-67 and accompanying text.
211. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-421(d) (Supp. 1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:
14(e)(1) (Gum. Supp. 1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6335(a)(2) (Purdon 1982).
212. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 793 (2d ed.
1972).
213. See generally Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process,
HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971).
214. See, A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 33 (1975);
Cocozza & Steadman, The Failureof PsychiatricPredictionsof Dangerousness. Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084, 1094-1101 (1976).
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[these predictions] were subjected to any of these three standards
of proof."2115 And, as Stone has concluded, "[e]ven if actuarial decan claim to
vices reduce the amount of predictive error none
216
meet even the lowest of these legal standards.

Following this logic, the setting of a standard of proof even as
low as "a preponderance of the evidence," would theoretically
preclude any application of the New York preventive detention
statute. For it seems clear that judges could rarely, if ever, be even
close to 50 percent certainty in their predictions of juvenile crime.
As Brooks has asked: "How can you prove by a standard requiring
well over 50 percent of accuracy that which21research tells you cannot be proved by 50 percent of accuracy?"
Despite this theoretical barrier, in reality courts do make frequent predictions of dangerousness, even where a standard of
proof as high as "clear and convincing evidence" is imposed-as,
for example, in the civil commitment of adults to mental hospitals.21 Presumably, imposing such a standard in juvenile detention
decisions like those made under the New York statute would reduce the percentage of "false positives.

' 21 9

But the question re-

mains: By how much?
The research reported by Wenk and his collegues 220 helps
provide an answer to this question. In their study of predictions
regarding juveniles committed to the California Youth Authority,
the Wenk group found an overall recidivism rate of 38.9 percent
and a violent recidivism rate of 2.4 percent.22 As noted earlier,

even after examining 100 variables and utilizing sophisticated
multivariate statistical techniques, these researchers were never
able to attain predictions with better than an 88 percent rate of
"false positives" (i.e., an eight-to-one ratio of false to true
positives).222
215. Cocozza & Steadman, supra note 214, at 1101.
216. A. STONE, supra note 214, at 33.
217.

A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY

AND THE

MENTAL HEALT

SYSTEM 128 (Supp.1980).

218. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (due process requires clear and
convincing evidence of civil commitment criteria, including mental illness and
dangerousness).
219. "Increasing the burden of proof is one way to impress the factfinder with the
importance of the decision and thereby perhaps to reduce the chances that inappropriate
commitments will be ordered." Id. at 427.
220. Wenk, Robinson & Smith, supra note 146.
221. Id. at 399.
222. Id. at 401.
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One method which has been suggested for avoiding the "false
positive" problem in behavioral prediction is the limitation of
such prediction to narrowly defined subgroups manifesting inordinately high base rates of the behavior to be predicted.2 23 Using
this sort of approach-comparable to demanding a higher standard of proof-Wenk and his colleagues isolated several groups of
juveniles with violent recidivism rates substantially higher than
those of others in the California Youth Authority population. 224
These groups included juveniles with records of aggressive crime
but no violence, juveniles with documented histories of violent behavior, and juveniles with four or more commitments to the
Youth Authority. Based on a post-release follow-up of fifteen
months, researchers found that juveniles in these high risk groups
had overall recidivism rates of 34.7%, 38.8%, and 53.5%, and violent recidivism rates of 1.3%, 5.2%, and 4.8%, respectively. 225
The significance of these findings is that the factors identifying these groups (i.e., aggressive crimes, histories of violence, and
multiple adjudications and commitments) seem likely to be most
prominent among the factors that would lead a judge to predict
future criminal behavior, even under a stringent standard of
proof. Yet clearly, predictions of further criminality based upon
any of these factors will entail a substantial percentage of "false
positives." Utilizing the best of these predictors-i.e., four or
more commitments-would reduce the "false positive" rate but
would still result in predictions of criminal conduct which prove
incorrect almost 50 percent of the time.
The persistence of high "false positive" rates, even among
predictions based upon the most convincing evidence, is no surprise given the rather low base rates of the behavior being predicted. Criminal behavior, particularly violent criminal behavior,
is relatively rare, even among juveniles and adults who have previously engaged in such behavior. 2 6 It is generally agreed that any
predictions of rare (i.e., low base rate) behavior are bound to include a substantial percentage of "false positives. '122 Livermore
223. von Hirsch, supra note 185, at 735.
224. Wenk, Robinson & Smith, supra note 146, at 398-99.
225. Id.
226. J. MONAHAN, supra note 70, at 24; Cocozza & Steadman, supra note 214, at 1089;
von Hirsch, supra note 185, at 735.
227. See, e.g., Cocozza & Steadman, supra note 214, at 1089; von Hirsch, supra note
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provides a graphic illustration of the problem:
Assume that one person out of a thousand will kill. Assume also that an
exceptionally accurate test is created which differentiates with 95 percent
effectiveness those who will kill from those who will not. If 100,000 people
were tested, out of the 100 who would kill 95 would be isolated. Unfortuwould not kill, 4,995 people would also be
nately, out of the 99,900 who
22 8
isolated as potential killers.

The question posed at the outset was: To what extent, if any,
can the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty interests under the
New York preventive detention statute be reduced by procedural
safeguards? In view of the foregoing analysis, the answer seems
clear: Very little. The statute requires predictions which have been
demonstrated empirically to be much more frequently wrong than
right. Even applying the significant limitations suggested by Judge
Newman,229 it appears that predictions of criminality would still
be plagued by "false positive" rates not substantially lower than
those which obtain in the absence of such safeguards.
III.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF

Martin

Despite the district court's conclusion that there exists no reliable method of predicting future criminal conduct or dangerousness2 3 0 -a

factual conclusion more than amply supported by the

evidence at trial and the Court's own review of the empirical literature 231-the Supreme Court flatly rejected the juvenile appellees' contention that the New York statute violates due process
because "it is virtually impossible to predict future criminal conduct with any degree of accuracy.

' 232

Writing for the majority in

Martin, Justice Rehnquist concluded that "from a legal point of
view there is nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction
of future criminal conduct.

2' 33

This final Section will examine some of the major implica185, at 733; von Hirsch & Gottfredson, supra note 129, at 15.
228. Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justificationsfor Civil Commitment, 117 U.
PA. L. REV. 75, 84 (1968) (footnote omitted).
229. See Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 377 (2d Cir. 1982) (Newman, J., concurring), rev'd sub noma.Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
230. United States ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 712 (S.D.N.Y.), affid,
689 F.2d (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
231. Id., at 708-12; Martin, 104 S. Ct. at 2425; supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
232. Martin, 104 S. Ct. at 2417.
233. Id.
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tions of Martin for the future use of predictions of dangerousness
in the criminal and juvenile justice systems. First, however, it is
necessary to consider the meaning of the Court's conclusion that
predictions of future criminal conduct are legally attainable and
the reasoning by which the majority reached that conclusion.
Justice Rehnquist offered two justifications for his conclusion
that criminal conduct is predictable. The first was precedent. Citing Jurek v. Texas,234 Justice Rehnquist said, "[W]e have specifically rejected the contention, based on the same sort of sociological data relied upon by appellees and the district court, 'that it is
impossible to predict future behavior and that the question is so
vague as to be meaningless.' "235 Justice Rehnquist's second rationale appeared to rely upon practice or tradition. As he stated,
without further elaboration, the prediction of criminal conduct
"forms an important element in many decisions" such as capital
sentencing, parole-release determinations, parole revocations, and
the sentencing of "dangerous special offenders."2 6
It seems clear, however, that neither of these rationales justifies Justice Rehnquist's conclusion. Rather, it appears that his conclusion regarding the predictability of criminal conduct can only
be understood as a pragmatic policy judgment, transcending the
limited question of juvenile detention based upon predictions of
dangerousness.
The unelaborated rationale of practice or tradition is entirely
unpersuasive in the Martin context. Justice Rehnquist is certainly
correct in his observation that predictions of criminal conduct
form the basis for many legal decisions.2 3 7 But in every instance
he cited (capital sentencing, parole release and revocation, and
sentencing "dangerous special offenders"), such predictions are
applied only to individuals already convicted of criminal acts. More234. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
235. Martin, 104 S. Ct. at 2417-18.

236. Id.
237. See Shah, Dangerousness: A Paradigmfor Exploring Some Issues in Law and Psychology, 33 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 224, 225 (1978) (predictions of criminal conduct or dangerousness are routinely used in decisions regarding bail or release on recognizance, waiver or
transfer of juveniles for trial in criminal court, sentencing, work-release and furlough of
penal inmates, parole, commitment of "sexually dangerous" offenders, transfers between
prisons and special facilities for disruptive inmates, commitment of drug addicts, commitment and release of mental patients including those acquitted by reason of insanity, transfers between ordinary and secure mental hospitals, sentencing of "habitual" and "dangerous" offenders, and imposition of the death sentence).
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over, in the death penalty context, where the Court has specifically upheld the use of predictions of dangerousness as a sentencing criterion, the importance of the extensive information
available to the decision-maker as well as the ability of the "adversary process" to distinguish opinion and unreliable evidence from
reliable evidence of the convicted defendant's dangerousness has
repeatedly been emphasized. 238
In Martin, however, the Court was confronted with a context
in which predictions of criminal conduct provided the basis for
abridging the liberty interests of individuals merely alleged to
have committed criminal acts. Furthermore, it was readily apparent to the Court that in the Martin context both the amount of
information available to the decision-maker and the potential corrective impact of the adversary process were extremely limited. 23 9
Justice Rehnquist also cited Jurek v. Texas as support for his
conclusion that "there is nothing inherently unattainable about a
prediction of future criminal conduct."24 0 As he correctly observed, the Supreme Court in Jurek rejected the contention that it
is "impossible to predict future behavior. 2 41 The problem with
Justice Rehnquist's reasoning is that the juvenile appellees in Martin never claimed that it is "impossible to predict future behavior." Their contention, as Justice Rehnquist specifically noted, was
to predict future criminal conduct
"that it is virtually impossible
242
with any degree of accuracy.

Injurek, the petitioner made it clear that he was not challeng238. See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) ("What is essential is that the
jury have before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose
fate it must determine. Texas [capital sentencing] law clearly assures that all such evidence
will be adduced."). See also Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 472 (1981) (citations omitted):
In Jurek v.Texas, we held that the Texas capital sentencing statute is not
unconstitutional on its face. As to the jury question on future dangerousness,
the joint opinion announcing the judgment emphasized that a defendant is free
to present whatever mitigating factors he may be able to show, e.g., the range
and severity of his past criminal conduct, his age, and the circumstances surrounding the crime for which he is being sentenced.
Finally, see Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 (1983) (:'We are unconvinced, however,
at least as of now, that the adversary process cannot be trusted to sort out the reliable from
the unreliable evidence and opinion about future dangerousness, particularly when the
convicted felon has the opportunity to present his own side of the case.").
239. See supra notes 173-80 and accompanying text.
240. Martin, 104 S.Ct. at 2417.
241. Id. at 2417-18.
242. Id. at 2417 (emphasis added).
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ing the accuracy of predictions of criminal conduct.2 43 As a result,
in Jurek, the Court simply reasoned that since predictions of criminal conduct are constantly made throughout the criminal justice
system, there is no reason to believe that they cannot be made.
Clearly avoiding any consideration of the accuracy of predictions
of criminal conduct, and without any further elaboration, the
Court simply stated:
It is, of course, not easy to predict future behavior. The fact that such a
determination is difficult, however, does not mean that it cannot be made.
Indeed, prediction of future criminal conduct is an essential element in
many of the decisions rendered throughout our criminal justice system. The
decision whether to admit a defendant to bail, for instance, must often turn
on a judge's prediction of the defendant's future conduct. And any sentencing authority must predict a convicted person's probable future conduct
when it engages in the process of determining what punishment to impose.
For those sentenced
to prison, these same predictions must be made by pa24
role authorities. 4

Clearly the Court's response in Jurek does not answer the contention of the appellees in Martin. The fact that predictions of criminal conduct are relied upon throughout the criminal justice system says nothing about the accuracy of such predictions or
whether that accuracy is sufficient to meet the 'demands of due
process.
In Barefoot v. Estelle,245 decided just a year before Martin, the
Supreme Court was confronted with a due process challenge
based upon the accuracy of predictions of criminal conduct. In upholding the challenged statute, the same statute earlier upheld in
Jurek, the Court frankly stated the concern which apparently lies
behind the cryptic rationale of practice or tradition relied upon in
both Jurek and Martin: "Acceptance of petitioner's position that
expert testimony about future dangerousness is far too unreliable
to be admissible would immediately call into question those other
243.

Brief for Petitioner at 53-54, Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976):
[Wle may put aside for now the issue whether predictions of individual
human behavior in the indeterminate future can be made in any meaningful
way.... We may put aside even the narrower issue whether such predictions
can be made with the degree of precision appropriate when the purpose of the
inquiry is to label a human creature fit or unfit to continue to exist .... That
question need not be reached here because the predictive judgment demanded
by the statute is wholly unintelligible even as a speculation.
244. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274-75 (footnotes omitted).
245. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
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contexts in which predictions of future behavior are constantly
made."246
Viewed in light of this concern, Justice Rehnquist's casual dismissal of the district court's conclusion regarding predictions of
criminal conduct is more readily understood. The logical implications of the empirical data relied upon by the district court were
inescapable and formed the basis for the appellees' contention
that future criminal conduct cannot be predicted with any degree
of accuracy. Any forthright appraisal of those data-such as that
undertaken by the district court and the dissenting justices in Martin 24

7

-would have made it almost impossible to reject that con-

tention. But, to paraphrase the Court in Barefoot, acceptance of
the appellees' contention would immediately have called into
question the many legal contexts in which predictions of future
criminal conduct are made and relied upon. As a strictly pragmatic matter of policy, given the extent to which the American
legal system relies upon predictions of criminal conduct, 248 such a
result appears almost unthinkable.
This logic explains why-to use the words of the dissenters-Justice Rehnquist, "brushes aside the District Court's findings" of fact. 249 To Justice Rehnquist, the appellees' contention

raised a question which was legal or normative rather than factual
or empirical. Hence, he regarded the district court's factual finding (and the empirical data upon which it rested) as irrelevant. As
he concluded: 'from a legal point of view there is nothing inher-

ently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal
conduct.' '250
In view of this analysis, Martin must be regarded as a new and
significant chapter in the jurisprudence of predictions of dangerousness. Not only did the Court hold that predictions of criminal
conduct (even those made on the basis of scant information in a
relatively non-adversary context) may be used as the basis for incarcerating individuals who have merely been charged with
246. Id. at 898.
247. See United States ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 708-12 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), aft'd, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403
(1984); Schall v. Martin 104 S. Ct. at 2425-26.
248. See Shah, supra note 237.
249. Martin, 104 S. Ct. at 2426 n.20.
250. Id. at 2417 (emphasis added).
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crimes, but it did so in a way which signals that the use of such
predictions in legal decision-making is now beyond empirical challenge. As a result, Martin appears to have important implications
reaching beyond the limited issue of pretrial detention of
juveniles charged with criminal acts. The remainder of this Section will be devoted to an examination of some of the potential
implications of Martin for both the juvenile and criminal justice
systems.
A.

Implications for the CriminalJustice System

Every United States jurisdiction allows for the pretrial detention of juveniles charged with criminal conduct. 5 1 Indeed, the
ubiquitousness of juvenile preventive detention statutes was one
rationale cited by the Supreme Court in upholding the New York
statute in Martin. 2 As the Court concluded,
In light of the uniform legislative judgment that pretrial detention of
juveniles properly promotes the interests both of society and the juvenile, we

conclude that the practice serves a legitimate regulatory purpose compatible
with the "fundamental3 fairness" demanded by the Due Process Clause in
25
juvenile proceedings.

State provisions allowing pretrial detention of adult criminal
defendants on the basis of predictions of dangerousness are not as
common. Yet in twenty-six of the fifty-one American jurisdictions,
there are either statutory or constitutional provisions which make
dangerousness a criterion to be considered in bail and other pretrial release decisions.254 In twenty jurisdictions, a criminal defendant may be denied release on recognizance if found by the court
251.
252.
253.
254.

Martin, 104 S. Ct. at 2411 n.16.
Id. at 2411-12.
Id. at 2412.
ARI7. CONsT. art. II, § 22 (1910, amended 1982); CAL CONST. art. I, § 12 (1974,
amended 1982); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 15(c); ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(a) (1984); DEL
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2105 (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1321, -1322 (1981); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 903.046 (West Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-1 (Supp. 1984); HAWAII REv.
STAT. § 804-7.1 (Supp. 1983); Act of Sept. 2, 1981, § 1, ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 110-10(b)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 811.2 (West Supp. 1984-1985); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 597: 6-a (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534(b) (1983); OR. REV. STAT. §§
135.230, .245 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-15-10 (Law. Co-op. 1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 23A-43-2 (Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7554 (1974); VA. CODE § 19.2-120
(1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 969.01 (West 1985); COL R. CRIM. P. 46; LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 317 (West Supp. 1984); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.02 (West Supp. 1984); OHio R CRIM.
P. 46; PA. R. CRIM. P. 4003; WASH. SuPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2.
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to be dangerous.25 5 In nineteen jurisdictions, courts may impose
additional conditions when releasing on bail a defendant found to
be dangerous. 256 In nine jurisdictions, courts have statutory authority to consider dangerousness in fixing the amount of cash
bail a defendant must post to be released. 5 And, most significantly, in nine jurisdictions, a defendant may be denied pretrial
release, even on bail, if found by the court to pose a danger to the
community. 5 8
In California, for example, a 1982 amendment to the state
constitution-passed in a popular referendum on the so-called
"Victim's Bill of Rights" 259 -provides that any defendant charged
with a felony involving personal violence may be denied bail if: (1)
proof of guilt is evident or the presumption thereof great; and (2)
the court finds, upon clear and convincing evidence, that there is
a substantial likelihood that release would result in great bodily
harm to others.2 60
255. CAL CONST. art. I, § 12 (1974, amended 1982); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14 (1885,
amended 1982); ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(a) (1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3961(B)
(Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2105 (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321 (1981); GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-6-1 (Supp. 1984); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597: 6-a (1981); OR. REV. STAT. §§
135.230, .245 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-15-10 (Law. Co-op. 1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 23A-43-2 (Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 19.2-120 (1983); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 969.035
1985); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 46.
256. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14 (1885, amended 1982); ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(b)
(1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3967 (Supp. 1984); COL REV. STAT. § 16-4-103(2) (Supp.
1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321(a) (1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 804-7.1 (Supp. 1983); Act
of Sept. 2, 1981, § 1, ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-10(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 811.2 (West Supp. 1984-1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534(b) (1983); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 135.230, .245, .260 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-15-10 (Law. Co-op. 1977); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-43-3, -4 (1979 & Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7554 (1974);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 969.01, .03 (West 1985); AR. R. CRIM. P. 9.3; COL. R. CRIM. P. 46; MINN.
R. CRIM. P. 6.02; OHIO R. CRIM. P. 46; WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2.
257. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(b) (1984); COL REV. STAT. § 16-4-105 (1978); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2107 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 903.046 (West Supp. 1984); LA, CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 317 (West Supp. 1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-15-10 (Law. Co-op.
1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-43-3, -4 (1979 & Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 7554 (1974); MINN. P, CRIM. P. 6.02.
258. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22 (1910, amended 1982); CAL CONST. art. I, § 12 (1974,
amended 1982); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14 (1885, "amended 1982); MICH. CONST. art. I, §
15(c); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3961(B) (Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322 (1981);
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-1 (Supp. 1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 804-7.1 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE
§ 19.2-120 (1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 969.035 (West 1985).
259. Note, The Problems FacingCalifornia'sNew Bail Standard, 5 GLENDALE L. REV. 203,
205 (1983).
260. CAL CONST. art. I, § 12 (1974, amended 1982).
(West
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In Wisconsin, a 1981 popular referendum resulted in an
amendment to the state constitution which provides that the legislature may authorize, but not require, state courts to deny pretrial
release for ten days prior to a hearing if the defendant is charged
with murder, sexual assault or the commission or attempted commission of any felony involving personal harm to another and has
a prior conviction for committing or attempting to commit such a
felony.2" 1 The amendment further provides for additionalpretrial
detention of up to sixty days if, following a hearing, the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the accused committed the felony charged; and (2) no available condition of release would adequately protect the community from serious bodily
harm.2 62 In 1982, the state legislature acted in accordance with
this amendment, implementing preventive detention by statute. 63
Another preventive detention statute worth mentioning as an
example is that of the District of Columbia. 2 " This law, which
provided the basis for the Harvard empirical study described earlier,28 5 represents the first legislative effort in this country to implement a program of adult pretrial detention based on predictions of dangerousness.2 6 6 The District of Columbia statute
permits the pretrial detention of a defendant charged with a
"dangerous crime" for up to sixty days if the court finds, by clear
and convincing evidence, that: (1) there is a substantial probability
that the defendant committed the offense charged; and (2) no
conditions of release would reasonably assure the safety of the
community. 2 7 The term "dangerous crime" includes the commission or attempted commission of robbery, burglary of a dwelling
or place of business, or arson of a dwelling or place of business;
forcible rape or assault with intent to commit forcible rape; and
sale or distribution of controlled drugs punishable by more than
one year in prison.26 8
261.

WIs. CONsT. art. I, § 8 (1981).

262. Id.
263. Wis. STAT.

ANN.

§ 969.035 (West 1985).

264. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1231-1332 (1981).
265. See supra notes 156-67 and accompanying text.
266. The D.C. preventive detention law was enacted as part of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473,
642 (1970) (codified at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1321, -1322 (1981)).
267. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322 (1981).
268. Id. § 23-1331.
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In 1981, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals found this
statute constitutional. In United States v. Edwards, the court held
that the eighth amendment "excessive bail" clause does not grant
a right to bail in criminal cases. 269 The court further held that
detention under the statute is regulatory rather than penal and
may be imposed without the full panoply of procedural safeguards
guaranteed in a criminal trial.2
Moreover, the court held the
statute neither vague nor overbroad.
In reaching these conclusions, the court conceded that chatacterization of detention under the statute "is a particularly close
question. ' 27 2 Yet it concluded that such detention is not punishment since it is designed "to curtail reasonably predictable conduct,
not to punish for prior acts. ' 27 1 Moreover, in rejecting the appellant's overbreadth argument based on "statistical studies concluding that criminal conduct generally cannot be predicted," the
court concluded that:
Prediction of the likelihood of certain conduct necessarily involves a margin
of error, but is an established component of our pretrial release system....
Appellant's argument relies on the assumptions, which we do not share, that
the judicial prediction of dangerousness, as distinguished from the prediction of likelihood of flight, is both a denial of a fundamental right and the
imposition of punishment. Accordingly, we decline to find the statute unconstitutionally overbroad. 27 4

In dissent, Judge Mack took strong exception to the majority's underlying presumption "that the state can predict those persons who are dangerous":
I have reviewed defense counsel's exhaustive treatment of this presumption and I am convinced by the authorities relied upon that the presumption
is not a valid one. Moreover, I am likewise convinced that the utilization of
this presumption for the asserted purpose will result in pretrial detention of
persons who pose no threat to the community. In my view, therefore, this
classification of "dangerousness" is arbitrary and invalid under due process
27 51
and equal protection principles.

At the time Martin was decided by the Supreme Court, the
269. 430 A.2d 1321, 1331 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
270. 430 A.2d at 1333.
271. Id. at 1342-43.

272. Id. at 1332.
273. Id. (emphasis added).
274. Id. at 1342-43.
275. Id. at 1369 (Mack, J., dissenting).
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District of Columbia bail statute was the only federal law providing for the pretrial detention of criminal defendants on the basis
of predictions of dangerousness. In federal courts outside the District of Columbia, a judicial officer's concern in setting bail or
other pretrial release conditions was limited by statute to assuring
that the defendant appeared for trial.2 In October 1984, however, just four months after the Supreme Court announced its decision in Martin, Congress passed, and the President signed into
law, the Bail Reform Act of 1984.7

Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, federal judicial officers
must consider not only whether a criminal defendant will appear
for trial, but also whether pretrial release of the defendant would
27 8
pose a danger to "any other person" or to the "community.

If

the judicial officer determines by clear and convincing evidence
that pretrial release would pose such a danger, a defendant may
be ordered detained prior to trial2. 7 The Act specifies no limit to
the duration of such pretrial detention.
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the constitutionality of
any state or federal law providing for the pretrial detention of
adult criminal defendants based on predictions of future criminal
conduct. In 1982, the Court denied certiorariin Edwards. 0° That
same year, the Court failed to reach the merits in Murphy v.
Hunt,"" a constitutional challenge to Nebraska's preventive detention law which allows courts to deny bail or other pretrial release
to defendants charged with certain crimes of violence, including
'"sexual offenses involving penetration by force or against the will
of the victim."282 In Hunt,283 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit had held that exclusion of alleged violent sexual offenders
from bail before trial violates the "excessive bail" clause of the
eighth amendment. 2 4 Concluding that the appellant's "constitu276. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 3143, 62 Stat. 683, 821 (1948) (provision for

"additional bail"), repealed by Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837
(to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150).
277. See Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
281. 455 U.S. 478 (1982).
282. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9 (1875, amended 1978).
283. 648 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated sub nom. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478

(1982).
284. Id. at 1164-65.
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tional claim to pretrial bail became moot following his conviction
in state court, 2 8 5 the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the
eighth circuit.2 8
It is important to note however, that in rejecting Hunt's claim
as moot, the Supreme Court provided a clear blueprint for overcoming the mootness barrier in future challenges to preventive
detention laws. The mootness problem could be avoided, the
Court suggested, if either a suit for damages, or a class action suit
by a class of pretrial detainees were instituted.87 This was the
very tactic used by the juvenile petitioners in Martin, where the
Court reached the merits despite the fact that "the pretrial detention of the class representatives [had] long since ended." 288Given
the availability of the class action tactic as a means of overcoming
the mootness problem which would plague most, if not all, Supreme Court challenges to adult preventive detention statutes, it
seems likely that before long the Court will be forced to rule on
the constitutionality of such laws. Martin leaves little doubt as to
how the Supreme Court will rule when that day comes.
Naturally, those challenging an adult preventive detention
statute will make every effort to distinguish their case from Martin. The obvious distinction is that Martin dealt with juveniles, a
class of individuals who "unlike adults, are always in some form of
custody, ' 2 9 and whose liberty interests "may, in appropriate circumstances, be subordinated to the State's 'parens patriae interest
in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child.' ",290
It is true that in Martin the Court leaned upon the argument
that juvenile preventive detention laws serve the "combined interest of protecting both the community and the juvenile himself.1 29 1
Yet it is equally true that the Court relied upon a number of other
arguments, each of which is relevant to both juvenile and adult
preventive detention.
First, the Court emphasized that "[t]he 'legitimate and compelling state interest' in protecting the community from crime
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id. at 48 1.
Id. at 481, 484.
Id. at 481-82.
Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2405 n.3 (1984).
Id. at 2410.
Id. (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982)).
Id. at 2410.
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cannot be doubted.

'29 2

Moreover, the Court observed that "[t]he

of a crime is not dependent upon the
harm suffered by the victim
' 293
age of the perpetrator.

Second, the Court concluded that pretrial detention of
juveniles is regulatory and not punitive,29 4 the same conclusion
reached by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Edwards
regarding pretrial detention of adult defendants. 29 5 In reaching

this conclusion, the Supreme Court relied on the fact that
"[t]here is no indication in the statute itself that preventive detention is used or intended as a punishment. ' 298 The same, of course,
may be said of every one of the current statutes which allows adult
defendants to be detained prior to trial on the basis of predictions
of criminal conduct. 297 As the court of appeals concluded in Edreasonably prewards, the clear purpose of such laws is "to curtail
298
dictable conduct, not to punish for prior acts.

Third, in Martin, the Court found that the procedural safeguards employed under the New York statute-limited though
they may be-"provide sufficient protection against erroneous
and unnecessary deprivations of liberty."299 Virtually all of the
procedural safeguards absent from the New York statute are present in most adult preventive detention statutes. For example, the
California, Wisconsin and District of Columbia statutes described
earlier all (1) limit the crimes for which arrest may subject a defendant to detention;300 (2) require a finding that the defendant
probably committed the crime charged; 301 (3) require assessment
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 2415.
295. 430 A.2d at 1332.
296. Martin, 104 S. Ct. at 2413.
297. See supra note 258.
298. 430 A.2d at 1332.
299. 104 S. Ct. at 2415-17.
300. CAL CONST. art. I, § 12 (1974, amended 1982) ("Felony offenses involving acts of
violence on another person .... ); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(a)(1) (1981) ("dangerous
crime"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 969.035 (West 1985) ("violent crime"). See also MICH. CONST.
art. I, § 15 ("violent felony," murder, treason, first-degree criminal sexual conduct, armed
robbery, and kidnapping with intent to extort money or valuables); Aaiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-3961(B) (Supp. 1984) (murder, rape, armed robbery, kidnapping, arson, burglary, aircraft hijacking, manufacture or sale of controlled substances, and aggravated assault).
301. CAL CONST. art. I, § 12 (1974, amended 1982); D.C. CODE ANN. § 231322(b)(2)(C) (1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. 969.035(6)(a) (West 1985).
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of specific factors in the defendant's background;30 2 (4) place limits on the type of crime the court must predict if the defendant is
to be detained;3 0 3 and (5) specify a standard of proof by which the
court must be persuaded
of the likelihood of future serious crimi04
nal behavior.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the Martin Court concluded that the prediction of criminal conduct or dangerousness is
legally attainable,3 0 5 even for juveniles, who are generally regarded as- less predictable than adults.308 Given the apparent
meaning of that conclusion, any challenge to adult preventive detention based upon proof of the inaccuracy of predictions of dangerousness seems destined to fail.
"It is, of course, not easy to predict future behavior."30a Nevertheless, given the above described line of reasoning in Martin
and the fact that the Supreme Court has never ruled that there is
a constitutional right to bail, 308 it seems safe to predict that when
faced squarely with the issue, the Court will uphold the preventive
302. CAL CONST. art. I,§ 12 ("the seriousness of the offense charged, the previous
criminal record of the defendant, and the probability of his or her appearing at the trial or
hearing in the case"); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321(b) (1981); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 969.035(2)(b)
(West 1985) ("previous conviction for committing or attempting to commit a violent
crime"). See also supra text accompanying note 160.
303. CAL CONsT. art. I, § 12 (1974, amended 1982) (substantial likelihood of great
bodily harm to others); D.C. CODE ANN.§ 23-1322(b) (1981) ("no condition or combination
of conditions of release which will reasonably assure the safety of any other person or the
community"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 969.035(3)(c) (West 1985) ("serious bodily harm").
304. CAL CONST. art. I, § 12 (1974, amended 1982) ("clear and convincing evidence");
D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(b)(2)(A) (1981) ("clear and convincing evidence"); Wis. STAT.
ANN. 969.035(6)(b) (West 1985) ("clear and convincing evidence").
305. 104 S. Ct. at 2417.
306. See generally G. MOHR & M. DESPRES, THE STORMY DECADE ADOLESCENCE (1958);
Fountain, Adolescent into Adult: An Inquiry, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOLESCENCE 196 (A.
Esman ed. 1975); W. EVERAERD, C. HINDLEY, A. BOT & J.TEN BOSCH, DEVELOPMENT IN ADOLESCENCE. PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIAL AND BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS (1983); and Capes, Adolescence
and Change, in ADOLESCENCE: THE CRISIS OF ADJUSTMENT 41 (S.Meyerson, ed. 1983).
307. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976).
308. In Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952), the Court noted that "the very language of the [Eighth] Amendment fails to say all arrests must be bailable." Id. at 546. In
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951), however, the Court recognized the "traditional right to
freedom before conviction [which] permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and
serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction." Id. at 4. Lower courts
have relied upon the Court's dicta in these two cases either to find or deny a constitutional
right to bail. See Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1498-1500
(1966); Comment, PreventiveDetention and United States v. Edwards: Burdening the Innocent,
32 AM. U.L. REV. 191, 196-99 (1982).
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pretrial detention of adults based upon predictions of dangerousness. In so doing, the Court will be placing the constitutional
stamp of approval on a process which will, in all likelihood, result
in the erroneous and needless incarceration of the majority of the
defendants to whom it is applied.
B.

Implications for the Juvenile Justice System

By analogy to public health models, efforts to prevent juvenile
crime may be characterized as primary, secondary, or tertiary
prevention. 309
Primary prevention efforts are directed at "institutions, organizations, social structures and cultural systems." 310 Their aim is
to "reduce aggregate rates of delinquency" 11 by "modifying conditions in the physical and social environment that lead to
crime. '3 12 Such efforts do not involve individual prediction or the
labelling of specific juveniles as "predelinquents" or "at risk."3'13
Secondary prevention efforts are aimed at youngsters designated "predelinquents" or otherwise predicted to be "at risk of
becoming involved in delinquency."3 14 The basic thrust of secondary prevention is "early identification and intervention in the lives
efforts require individual
of individuals.1 1 5 Secondary prevention
36
predictions of future conduct.
Tertiary prevention efforts are directed toward individuals already "officially identified" or "adjudicated" as "delinquents."3 ""
The aim of such efforts is "the prevention of recidivism. 3s1 The
standard means of tertiary prevention are correction and
309. See generally PREVENTION OF MENTAL DISORDERS IN CHILDREN 4-19 (G. Caplan ed.
1961); OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PREVENTION: A COMPENDIUM
OF 36 PROGRAM MODELS 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 36 PRoGRAM MODELS].
310. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, THE PREVENTION OF SERIOUS DELINQUENCY: WHAT
To Do? 12 (1981) [hereinafter cited as WHAT To Do?].

311.

Id.

36 PROGRAM MODELS, supra note 309, at 1.
See WHAT To Do?, supra note 310, at 11-12.
314. Id. at 13 (emphasis removed).
315. 36 PROGRAM MODELS, supra note 309, at 1.
316. WHAT To Do?, supra note 310, at 13-14.
317. Id. at 14.
318. 36 PROGRAM MODELS, supra note 309, at 1.

312.
313.
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rehabilitation.3 19
The type of juvenile crime prevention approved by the Supreme Court in Martin is basically tertiary. Preventive detention
of juveniles charged with crimes is clearly designed to prevent recidivism. Juvenile preventive detention, however, also resembles
secondary prevention in that it may be applied to youngsters who
have not yet been adjudicated delinquent but have merely been
identified as being at risk for future criminal conduct. While the
Court's decision in Martin is limited to juveniles who have at least
been formally accused of criminal conduct, the Court's reasoning
suggests that Martin may have significant implications for secondary prevention efforts aimed at a much broader class of juveniles.
The juvenile justice system has traditionally relied primarily
upon tertiary prevention.3 20 The system has "responded to crimes
by juveniles with a wide range of services focused on control and/
or rehabilitation of youthful offenders. 3 21 In recent years, however, "a new approach has emerged: the prevention of crime
before youths engage in delinquent acts. 3 22 Since at least 1967,
this "new approach" has been emphasized by governmental commissions and in various acts of Congress. 23
Implementation of this "new approach" to delinquency prevention has spawned dozens, if not hundreds, of delinquency prevention programs throughout the country, the bulk of which have
been federally funded.3 2 To date, most such programs have been
aimed either at youngsters in general or at selected populations of
youngsters thought to be at particularly high risk for delinquency. 25 As such, these programs may be characterized as primary prevention.
Efforts at individualized prevention-i.e., secondary prevention-have been limited by two factors: (1) concern over the ability of experts or statistical tables to accurately identify "predelinquents"; 26 and (2) reservations about the propriety if not the
legality of labelling and intervening in the lives of youngsters who
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

To Do?, supra note 310, at 5.
Id. at 15.
36 PROGRAM MODELS, supra note 309, at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 7-16.
See WHAT To Do?, supra note 310, at 13.
WHAT
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have not yet been accused of criminal conduct. 27 Such efforts,
however, have not been without proponents.
For example, in looking back over four decades of research
aimed at identifying "predelinquents," Sheldon Glueck wrote:
If the argument of those who oppose the use of identification techniques to
disclose which children are vulnerable were sound, we should logically ...
sit back complacently (as, unfortunately, we too often do today) until the
child has developed into a true delinquent or gang member and then haul
him into court with the usual far from satisfactory result. 328

As Glueck saw it, "The choice presented to a community is
whether its citizens prefer to let potentially delinquent children
ripen into persistent offenders or to intervene, prophylactically, at
a stage which gives the greatest promise of changing their dangerous attitudes and behavior ...

29

Glueck felt that the necessary "prophylactic" intervention
could be "voluntary" rather than "compulsory" and that those
"entrusted with the job" could "be expected to be more, perceptie and tactful than to 'stigmatize' a child as a predelinquent."330
"[I]t cannot be supposed," Glueck wrote, "that trained social
workers would typically force themselves into a home and dramatically announce, 'Your child has been predicted as a
"3 1

delinquent!'
The voluntary approach envisioned by Glueck has been
widely implemented. Today all sorts of intervention programs are
available to parents who wish to volunteer themselves or their
children for special treatment. The federally funded community
mental health center is perhaps the clearest example.3 32
The main impediment to success of this voluntary approach is
that it is indeed voluntary. Parents of children predicted to be at
risk for delinquency are free to accept or reject intervention.
And, unfortunately, those parents whose children most need in327.

See Monahan, Childhood Predictorsof Adult CriminalBehavior, in EARLY CHILDHOOD
19 (F. Dutile, C. Foust, & D. Webster eds. 1982).
328. Glueck, supra note 99, at 318.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 317.
332. Hopson, Commentary, in EARLY CHILDHOOD INTERVENTION AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 125 (F. Dutile, C. Foust, & D. Webster eds. 1982). See also Community Mental
Health Centers Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2681-2689(m) (1982); 36 PROGRAM MODELS, supra note
309, at 20-143 (descriptions of 36 voluntary intervention programs).
INTERVENTION AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
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tervention are often the most resistant to it.3 33 Moreover, even

when parents are willing to "volunteer" their4 children for inter33
vention, the children themselves may resist.

In view of these limitations to the voluntary prevention approach, some commentators have suggested compulsory intervention in the lives of youngsters predicted to be at risk for becoming
delinquents. In the case of adjudicated delinquents or status offenders, there is already a statutory basis for such compulsory intervention.3 3 5 To date, however, the juvenile justice system has
been given no legal authority to mandate intervention where a
child is merely predicted to become a delinquent. Thus, any effort
at compulsory intervention in such cases would require legislative
initiatives.
One suggested form for such legislation is the expansion of
existing status offender laws to include predelinquents.330 This approach would expand the reach of such laws to encompass not
only so-called persons or children in need of supervision (PINS
and CHINS)-i.e., runaways, truants and children who refuse to
comply with parental commands-but also youngsters merely predicted to become delinquent. 33 7 Such an expansion of the juvenile
courts' jurisdiction would provide the needed authority for state
intervention regardless of parental consent. 38
The other form of legislation which has been suggested involves authorization of compulsory intervention without any judicial finding that a child is delinquent or in need of supervision.
Such a statute would authorize compulsory intervention in the
lives of "potentially delinquent" children "along the lines of compulsory vaccination, compulsory quarantine for kids with measles,
mandatory automobile child restraints, requirements that certain
children have certain kinds of medicine put in their eyes at birth,
333. Early Identification and Classification of Juvenile Delinquents: HearingBefore the Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice of the Senate Committee on the Constitution, 97th Cong., Ist Sess.
34 (1981) (prepared statement of Dr. David P. Farrington).
334. See Monahan, supra note 327, at 21 n.23 ("The true test of voluntariness is
whether the child can say 'no' and walk out the door."). See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584 (1979) (adversary hearing not required when parents seek to have minor child committed to mental institution).
335. See generally J.MURRAY, STATUS OFFENDERS: A SOURCEBOOK (1983). See also Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REV. 503, 503-04 n.1 (1984).
336.

Hopson, supra note 332, at 127.

337. Id.
338. Id.
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compulsory-educational tracking statutes, and the more general
compulsory education statute."3 9 Such a statute, it has been
urged, would be justified not by "the parens patriaeconcept of the
juvenile court" but rather by "the general concept of the state's
police power." 3' 40
Thus far, commentators have not specified the precise parameters of a compulsory intervention statute of this sort. However,
at least two authorities have hinted at what those parameters
might be. In 1970, for example, President Nixon asked the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to consider the proposals of Dr. Arnold Hutschnecker. 3" Hutschnecker, who served
as psychiatric consultant to the National Commission on the
Causes and Prevention of Violence, had suggested the mandatory
mass screening of every child between the ages of six and eight in
the United States to determine their potential for criminal behavior.34 2 Hutschnecker further suggested immediate "[c]orrective
treatment ... for all those tested who show delinquent tenden-

cies." 34 3 For younger children identified as predelinquent, he recommended mandatory after-school counseling. Older youngsters
with established criminal propensities, he said, should be sent to
special camps for massive psychological and psychiatric treatment
including "Pavlovian methods which I have seen used effectively
in the Soviet Union.
More recently, another psychiatric commentator has suggested that "psychiatric examination of children at school entrance time should be required like vaccination. 31 4

5

Children

found to be disturbed; he suggested, should be denied entrance to
school unless their parents agree to psychiatric treatment for the
child-or for themselves. Those found to be "dangerously disturbed," he said, should be subjected to "enforced treatment"
which "might prevent many future [Lee Harvey] Oswalds. ' 34 6

To date, no statutes of this sort have been enacted. Yet there
Id. at 126.
Id.
L.A. Times, Apr. 5, 1970, at 9, col. 4.
Id.
Physician Heal Thyself, TIME, April 20, 1970, at 8.
Id.
Bellak, The Need for Public Health Laws for Psychiatric Illness, 61 AM. J.
HEALTH 119, 120 (1971).
346. Id.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
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are clear indications that compulsory intervention in the name of
delinquency prevention is very much on the minds of legislators.
For example, in 1981, the Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice held a hearing on the "early identification and classification of
juvenile delinquents. 3 47 In opening the hearing, subcommittee
chairperson, Senator Arlen Specter, stated the agenda:
There is an evolving pattern which I personally have observed and has
been noted by many others where the juvenile is a truant at the age of 8 or
9, a vandal at 10 or 11, and guilty of minor petty larceny at 12 or 13, burglary of a vacant building at 13 or 14, perhaps robbery at 15 and robberymurder at 17. The question is whether we can identify in this crime cycle
the critical spot where we might direct some greater attention, such as family counseling or perhaps psychological or psychiatric care or a variety of
potential corrective actions which might take the juvenile out of the crime

cycle.,$

Later in the proceedings, Senator Specter made clear the
point of the hearing: "The issue is, At what point do we intervene
349
on a nonvoluntary basis?"
Authorization of nonvoluntary or compulsory intervention in
the lives of children not yet formally identified as delinquents but
merely predicted to be at risk for delinquent behavior is a drastic
step which, to date, no governmental body, state or federal, has
been willing to take. Statutory proposals such as those described
above have been decried as fraught with constitutional objections. 50 In Martin, however, the Supreme Court appears to have
obviated such objections.
Recall, for example, that in Martin the Court concluded that:
(1) as a legal matter it is possible to predict future criminal conduct; 351 (2) even intervention as oppressive as incarceration does
not constitute "punishment" when applied to juveniles predicted
to commit crimes352 but rather protects "both the community and
the juvenile himself"; 35 3 (3) the state has a "legitimate and com347. Early Identification and Classification ofJuvenile Delinquents:Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice of the Senate Committee on the Constitution, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981).

348. Id. at 1 (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter).
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
See Hopson, supra note 332, at 126-27.
Schall v. Martin, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2417-18 (1984).
See id. at 2412-15.
Id. at 2412.
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pelling interest" in preventing crime;3 " and (4) this interest outweighs the liberty interests of juveniles, who are "always in some
form of custody" anyway.355
While Martin pertained to juveniles at least formally accused
of crimes, the conclusions reached by the Court in sustaining the
New York detention statute have clearly foreclosed many, if not
all, of the major constitutional objections which might be raised
against statutes authorizing compulsory intervention in the lives of
children merely predicted to be at risk for future criminal conduct.
How legislators will respond in light of Martin remains to be seen.
It might be hoped that state lawmakers will see the obvious lesson
in the empirical research reviewed in this Article. There is good
reason, however, to believe that they may instead begin to act
upon the kinds of statutory proposals described earlier-proposals
which would authorize coercive state intervention premised solely
upon individual predictions of dangerousness. As Professor Tribe
has observed, "The inevitable consequence [of preventive detention] is a continuing pressure to broaden the system in order to
reach ever more potential detainees. Indeed, this pressure will be
made preventive detention seem
generated by the same fears that
56
attractive in the first place.

3'

CONCLUSION

In Schall v. Martin, the Supreme Court held that, in the interest of crime prevention, juveniles merely accused of crimes may
be incarcerated before trial, indeed even before a finding of probable cause, simply on the basis of judicial predictions of criminal
conduct. Empirical research indicates that such predictions are
more likely to prove wrong than right and suggests that this likelihood of error cannot be reduced appreciably by the imposition of
procedural safeguards. In light of this research, it seems clear that
many if not most juveniles detained on the basis of predictions of
criminal behavior will be erroneously identified as potential
criminals or recidivists and be needlessly incarcerated.
Viewed most narrowly, Martin affirmatively sanctions a pro354. Id. at 2410.
355. Id.
356. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: PreventiveJustice in the World ofJohn Mitchell, 56 VA.
L. REv. 371, 375 (1970).
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cess which unreasonably interferes with the liberty interests of
juveniles alleged to have committed crimes. The Court's reasoning in Martin, however, also appears to portend Supreme Court
approval of preventive detention for adult criminal defendants, a
practice the constitutionality of which seems bound to be determined by the Court in the near future. Furthermore, the Court's
reasoning in Martin may well be read by legislators and policymakers as condoning, if not encouraging, state-mandated intervention
in the lives of juveniles not yet charged with wrongful acts but
merely predicted to become delinquent.
While Martin has already been hailed as "a major victory for
the preservation of the juvenile-justice system, '3

57

the present

analysis suggests that it might more properly be regarded as "the
first step of a profound shift in our system of criminal justice-a
system that, at least until now, has operated on the premise that
crime should

. . .

be prevented by the threat of subsequent pun-

ishment rather than the imposition of prior imprisonment. '" 858

357. N.Y. Times, June 5, 1984 at B-5, col. 1 (quoting Leroy S. Zimmerman, Attorney
General of Pennsylvania, "one of 23 state attorneys general who signed a 'friend of the
court' brief on behalf of the New York statute").
358. Tribe, supra note 356, at 375.

